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Abstract
We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for structuring the
space of quantitative games and solving them that does not rely on a reduc-
tion to qualitative games. We show that such reductions exhibit the same
desirable properties as their qualitative counterparts and that they addition-
ally retain the optimality of solutions. Moreover, we introduce vertex-ranked
games as a general-purpose target for quantitative reductions and show how
to solve them. In such games, the value of a play is determined only by a
qualitative winning condition and a ranking of the vertices.
We provide quantitative reductions of quantitative request-response games
and of quantitative Muller games to vertex-ranked games, thus showing Ex-
pTime-completeness of solving the former two kinds of games. In addition,
we exhibit the usefulness and flexibility of vertex-ranked games by showing
how to use such games to compute fault-resilient strategies for safety speci-
fications. This work lays the foundation for a general study of fault-resilient
strategies for more complex winning conditions.
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1. Introduction
The study of quantitative infinite games has garnered great interest lately,
as they allow for a much more fine-grained analysis and specification of re-
active systems than classical qualitative games [2–8]. While there exists
previous work investigating quantitative games, the approaches to solving
them usually rely on ad-hoc solutions that are tailor-made to the considered
winning condition. Moreover, quantitative games are usually solved by re-
ducing them to a qualitative game in a first step, hardcoding a certain value
of interest during the reduction. In particular, to the best of our knowledge,
there exists no general framework for the analysis of such games that is anal-
ogous to the existing one for qualitative games. In this work, we introduce
such a framework that disentangles the study of quantitative games from
that of qualitative ones.
Qualitative infinite games have been applied successfully in the verifi-
cation and synthesis of reactive systems [9–12]. They have given rise to a
multitude of algorithms that ascertain system correctness and that synthesize
correct-by-construction systems. In such a game, two players, called Player 0
and Player 1, move a token in a directed graph. After infinitely many moves,
the resulting sequence of vertices is evaluated and one player is declared the
winner of the play. For example, in a qualitative request-response game [13],
the goal for Player 0 is to ensure that every visit to a vertex denoting some
request is eventually followed by a visit to a vertex denoting an answer to
that request. In order to solve qualitative games, i.e., to determine a winning
strategy for one player, one often reduces a complex game to a potentially
larger, but conceptually simpler one. For example, in a multi-dimensional
request-response game, i.e., in a request-response game in which there ex-
ist multiple conditions that can be requested and answered, one stores the
set of open requests and demands that every request is closed at infinitely
many positions. As this is a Bu¨chi condition, which is much simpler than
the request-response condition, one is able to reduce request-response games
to Bu¨chi games.
In recent years the focus of research has shifted from the study of quali-
tative games, in which one player is declared the winner of a given play, to
that of quantitative games, in which the resulting play is assigned some value
or cost. Such games allow, for example, modeling systems in which requests
have to be answered within a certain number of steps [4, 6, 14–16], systems
with one or more finite resources which may be drained and charged [17–20],
2
or scenarios in which each move incurs a certain cost for either player [5, 8].
In general, Player 0 aims to minimize the cost of the resulting play, i.e.,
to maximize its value, while Player 1 seeks to maximize the cost, thus mini-
mizing the value. In a quantitative request-response game, for example, it is
the goal of Player 0 to minimize the number of steps taken between requests
and their corresponding answers. The typical questions asked in the context
of such games are “Does there exist an upper bound on the time between re-
quests and responses that Player 0 can ensure?” [6, 14, 16, 21], “Can Player 0
ensure an average cost per step greater than zero?” [8], “What is the mini-
mal time between requests and responses that Player 0 can ensure?” [7], or
“What is the minimal average level of the resource that Player 0 can ensure
without it ever running out?” [17]. The former two questions can be seen as
boundedness questions, while the latter two are asking for optimal solutions.
Such decision problems are usually solved by fixing some bound b on the
cost of the resulting plays and subsequently reducing the problem of finding
a strategy for Player 0 that enforces a cost of at most b in the quantitative
game to the problem of solving a qualitative game, hardcoding the fixed b
in the process. The problem of deciding whether or not Player 0 has such a
strategy is called the (b-)threshold problem.
For example, in order to determine the winner in a quantitative request-
response game as described above for some bound b, we construct a Bu¨chi
game in which every time a request is opened, a counter for that request is
started which counts up to the bound b and is reset if the request is answered.
Once any counter exceeds the value b, we move to a terminal position indi-
cating that Player 0 has lost. We then require that every counter is inactive
infinitely often, which is again a Bu¨chi condition and thus much simpler than
the original quantitative request-response condition. Thus, Player 0 wins the
resulting qualitative game if and only if she can ensure that every request is
answered within at most b steps in the quantitative game.
Such reductions are usually specific to the problem being addressed. Fur-
thermore, they immediately abandon the quantitative aspect of the game
under consideration, as the bound is hardcoded during the first step of the
analysis. Thus, even when only changing the bound one is interested in, the
reduction has to be recomputed and the resulting qualitative game has to
be solved from scratch. In our request-response example, if one is interested
in deciding the b′-threshold problem for some b′ 6= b, one constructs a new
Bu¨chi game for the bound b′. This game is then solved independently of the
one previously computed for the bound b.
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In this work, we lift the concept of reductions for qualitative games to
quantitative games. Such quantitative reductions enable the study of a mul-
titude of optimization problems for quantitative games in a way similar to
decision problems for qualitative games. When investigating quantitative
request-response games using quantitative reductions, for example, we only
compute a single, simpler quantitative game and subsequently check this
game for a winning strategy for Player 0 for any bound b. If she has such a
strategy in the latter game, the quantitative reduction yields a strategy for
her satisfying the same bound in the former one.
In general, we retain the intuitive property of reductions for qualitative
games: Using quantitative reductions, the properties of a complex quantita-
tive game can be studied by investigating a potentially larger, but conceptu-
ally simpler quantitative game.
Contributions We present the first framework for reductions between
quantitative games and we provide vertex-ranked games as general-purpose
targets for such reductions. Moreover, we show tight bounds on the com-
plexity of solving vertex-ranked games with respect to a given bound.
Subsequently, we provide three examples illustrating the use of the con-
cepts introduced in this work: First, we define quantitative request-response
games and solve them using quantitative reductions to vertex-ranked games.
Second, we show how to solve quantitative Muller games as defined by Mc-
Naughton [22] via quantitative reductions to vertex-ranked safety games.
Third, we illustrate the versatility of vertex-ranked games by using them to
compute fault-resilient strategies for safety games with faults. We summarize
our contributions with regards to solving quantitative games in Table 1 and
we summarize our contributions with regards to solving quantitative games
optimally in Table 2.
Structure of this work After introducing qualitative and quantitative
games formally in Section 2, we define quantitative reductions in Section 3
and show that they provide a mechanism to determine the minimal bound b
such that Player 0 can enforce a cost of at most b in a given quantitative
game: If a game G can be reduced to a game G ′, then we can use a strategy
for Player 0 that minimizes the cost of plays in G ′ to construct a strategy for
her which minimizes the cost of plays in G.
In Section 4, we define vertex-ranked games, very general classes of quan-
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Game Time Space Memory
Vertex-ranked
sup-games
O(n) + t(|G|) O(n) + s(|G|) O(|σ|)
Vertex-ranked
lim sup-games
O(n3 + n2 · t(|G|)) O(n+ s(|G|)) O(|σ|)
Quantitative
request-response games
O(n2b2dd22d) – O(nbdd2d)
Quantitative
Muller games
O((n!)3) – O((n!)3)
Table 1: A summary of the proofs in work concerned with solving games. For each
game, n denotes the number of vertices of the game. For vertex-ranked games, G denotes
the underlying qualitative game while t(|G|) and s(|G|) denote the time and space required
to solve that underlying game. Furthermore, σ denotes the size of a winning strategy in
the corresponding qualitative game. For request-response games, d and W denote the
number of request-response pairs and the largest weight assigned to any edge in the game,
respectively. For the sake of brevity and consistency, we use the shorthand b = d2dnW .
Game Time Space
Vertex-ranked
sup-games
O(log(M)(n+ t(|G|))) O(M) + s(|G|)
Vertex-ranked
lim sup-games
O(log(M)(n3 + n2 · t(|G|))) O(n+ s(|G|))
Quantitative
request-response games
O(log(b)(n2b2dd22d)) –
Quantitative
Muller games
O((n!)3) –
Table 2: A summary of the proofs in work concerned with solving games optimally. For
vertex-ranked games, M denotes the number of different ranks assigned to vertices in the
game. The remaining symbols are defined as in Table 1.
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titative games that can be used as targets for quantitative reductions. The
quantitative condition of such games is quite simple in that the cost of a play
is determined only by a qualitative winning condition and by a ranking of the
vertices of the game. If the resulting play is winning according to the qual-
itative condition, then its cost is given by the highest rank visited at all or
visited infinitely often, depending on the particular variant of vertex-ranked
games. Otherwise, the value of the play is infinite. We show that solving
such vertex-ranked games is as hard as solving games with the underlying
qualitative winning condition.
Finally, in Section 5 we provide three examples of the versatility of vertex-
ranked games: First, we define and solve request-response games with costs
via quantitative reductions. Second, we recall the definition of quantitative
Muller games due to McNaughton [22] and show how to solve these games via
quantitative reductions as well. Third, we discuss how to use vertex-ranked
games to compute fault-resilient strategies in safety games with faults [23].
In such games, after Player 0 has picked a move, say to vertex v, a fault
may occur, which overrides the choice of Player 0 and the game continues in
vertex v′ 6= v instead. By using vertex-ranked games, we are able to compute
strategies that are resilient against as many faults as possible.
2. Preliminaries
We first define notions that are common to both qualitative and quantita-
tive games. Afterwards, we recapitulate the standard notions for qualitative
games before defining quantitative games and lifting the notions for qualita-
tive games to the quantitative case.
We denote the non-negative integers by N and define [n] = {0, 1, . . . , n−1}
for every n ≥ 1. Also, we define ∞ > n for all n ∈ N and N∞ = N ∪ {∞}.
Finally, for any set V , we write |V | and V ω to denote the cardinality of V
and the set of all infinite sequences over V , respectively. An arena A =
(V, V0, V1, E, vI) consists of a finite, directed graph (V,E), a partition (V0, V1)
of V into the vertices of Player 0 and Player 1, and an initial vertex vI ∈ V .
The size of A, denoted by |A|, is defined as |V |. A play in A is an infinite
path ρ = v0v1v2 · · · through (V,E) starting in vI . To rule out finite plays,
we require every vertex to be non-terminal, i.e., we require that for every
vertex v ∈ V there exists some vertex v′ ∈ V such that (v, v′) ∈ E.
A strategy for Player i is a mapping σ : V ∗Vi → V that assigns to each
play prefix pi ending in a vertex of Player i a vertex σ(pi) to move to. Formally,
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we require (v, σ(piv)) ∈ E for all pi ∈ V ∗, v ∈ Vi. We say that σ is positional
if σ(piv) = σ(v) for every pi ∈ V ∗, v ∈ Vi. A play v0v1v2 · · · is consistent with
a strategy σ for Player i, if vj+1 = σ(v0 · · · vj) for all j with vj ∈ Vi.
A memory structure M = (M,mI ,Upd) for an arena (V, V0, V1, E, vI)
consists of a finite set M of memory states, an initial memory state mI ∈M ,
and an update function Upd: M × V →M . We extend the update function
to finite play prefixes in the usual way: Upd+(vI) = mI and Upd
+(piv) =
Upd(Upd+(pi), v) for play prefixes pi ∈ V + and v ∈ V . A next-move func-
tion Nxt: Vi × M → V for Player i has to satisfy (v,Nxt(v,m)) ∈ E for
all v ∈ Vi, m ∈ M . Each pair of a memory structure M and a next-
move function Nxt induces a strategy σ for Player i with memory M via
σ(v0 · · · vj) = Nxt(vj,Upd+(v0 · · · vj)). A strategy is called finite-state if it
can be implemented by a memory structure. We define |M| = |M |. In a
slight abuse of notation, the size |σ| of a finite-state strategy is the size of a
memory structure implementing it.
An arena A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI) together with a memory structure M =
(M,mI ,Upd) for A induce the extended arena
A×M = (V ×M,V0 ×M,V1 ×M,E ′, (vI ,mI)) ,
where E ′ is defined via ((v,m), (v′,m′)) ∈ E ′ if and only if (v, v′) ∈ E and
Upd(m, v′) = m′. Every play ρ = v0v1v2 · · · in A has a unique extended play
extM(ρ) = (v0,m0)(v1,m1)(v2,m2) · · · in A ×M defined by m0 = mI and
mj+1 = Upd(mj, vj+1), i.e., mj = Upd
+(v0 · · · vj). We omit the indexM if it
is clear from the context. The extension of a finite play prefix in A is defined
analogously.
Let A be an arena, let M1 = (M1,m1I ,Upd1) be a memory structure
for A, and let M2 = (M2,m2I ,Upd2) be a memory structure for A ×M1.
We defineM1×M2 = (M1×M2, (m1I ,m2I),Upd), where Upd((m1,m2), v) =
(m′1,m
′
2) if Upd1(m1, v) = m
′
1 and Upd2(m2, (v,m
′
1)) = m
′
2. Via a straight-
forward induction and in a slight abuse of notation we obtain
Upd+M1×M2(pi) = (Upd
+
M1(pi),Upd
+
M2(extM1(pi)))
for all finite play prefixes pi, where we do not distinguish between the terms
(v,m1,m2), ((v,m1),m2), and (v, (m1,m2)).
2.1. Qualitative Games
A qualitative game G = (A,Win) consists of an arena A with vertex
set V and a set Win ⊆ (V ′)ω of winning plays for Player 0, for some superset
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V ′ ⊇ V . We call Win the winning condition of G. In, e.g., a request-response
game as described in Section 1, the winning condition contains the plays ρ
in which for every visit to a vertex denoting a request there is a subsequent
visit to a vertex denoting a response. The set of winning plays for Player 1 is
V ω \Win. As our definition of games is very general, the infinite object Win
may not be finitely describable. If it is, however, we slightly abuse notation
and define |G| as the sum of |A| and the size of a description of Win. In, e.g.,
the case of a request-response game, the set Win can be described via two
sets Q,P ⊆ V , where Q and P denote the vertices representing requests and
responses, respectively. We omit, however, a general definition of the term
“description of Win”, as it is irrelevant for this work.
A strategy σ for Player i is a winning strategy for her in G = (A,Win)
if all plays consistent with σ are winning for her. If Player i has a winning
strategy, then we say she wins G. Solving a game amounts to determining
its winner, if one exists. A game is determined if one player has a winning
strategy.
2.2. Quantitative Games
Quantitative games extend the classical model of qualitative games. In a
quantitative game, plays are not partitioned into winning and losing plays,
but rather they are assigned some measure of quality. We keep this definition
very general in order to encompass many of the already existing models. In
Section 4, we give concrete examples of such games and show how to solve
them optimally.
A quantitative game G = (A,Cost) consists of an arena A with vertex
set V and a cost-function Cost : (V ′)ω → N∞ for plays where V ′ ⊇ V is again
some superset of V . Similarly to the winning condition in the qualitative
case, Cost is, in general, an infinite object. If it is finitely describable, we,
again slightly abusively, define the size |G| of G as the sum of |A| and the size
of a description of Cost. A cost function may, e.g., be described via a finite
Mealy machine [24] that processes the play and outputs a natural number
on each step. The cost of a play could then be defined as the supremum,
infimum, or average of the resulting sequence of numbers. In such a case, a
description of the cost function would consist of the Mealy machine, while
the size of the description of the function could be defined as the sum of
number of states of the machine and the length of the largest integer that is
output by the machine.
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A play ρ in A is winning for Player 0 in G if Cost(ρ) < ∞. Winning
strategies, the winner of a game, and solving a game are defined as in the
qualitative case. In order to simplify the presentation, we only consider the
case in which Player 0 aims to minimize the cost of a play. All concepts in
this work can, however, be easily adapted to the dual case in which Player 0
aims to maximize the cost of a play.
We extend the cost-function over plays to strategies by defining Cost(σ) =
supρ Cost(ρ) and Cost(τ) = infρ Cost(ρ), where ρ ranges over the plays con-
sistent with the strategy σ for Player 0 and over the plays consistent with the
strategy τ for Player 1, respectively. Moreover, we say that a strategy σ for
Player 0 is optimal if its cost is minimal among all strategies for her. Dually,
a strategy τ for Player 1 is optimal for him if its cost is maximal among all
strategies for him.
For every strategy σ for Player 0, Cost(σ) <∞ implies that σ is winning
for Player 0. However, the converse does not hold true: Each play consistent
with some strategy σ may have finite cost, while for every n ∈ N there exists
a play ρ consistent with σ with Cost(ρ) ≥ n. In contrast, a strategy τ for
Player 1 has Cost(τ) =∞, if and only if τ is winning for him.
We say that Player 0 wins G with respect to b if she has a strategy σ
with Cost(σ) ≤ b. Dually, if Player 1 has a strategy τ with Cost(τ) > b,
then we say that he wins G with respect to b. Solving a quantitative game G
with respect to b amounts to deciding whether or not Player 0 wins G with
respect to b. We call this decision problem the b-threshold problem of G and
omit the b if it is clear from the context.
If Player 0 has a strategy σ with Cost(σ) ≤ b, then for all strategies τ
for Player 1 we have Cost(τ) ≤ b. Dually, if Player 1 has a strategy τ with
Cost(τ) > b, then for all strategies σ for Player 0 we have Cost(σ) > b. We
say that a quantitative game is determined if for each b ∈ N, either Player 0
has a strategy with cost at most b, or Player 1 has a strategy with cost
strictly greater than b.
We say that b ∈ N is a cap of a quantitative game G if Player 0 winning G
implies that she has a strategy with cost at most b. A cap b for a game G is
tight if it is minimal.
3. Quantitative Reductions
Before defining quantitative reductions, we first recall the definition of
qualitative ones. To this end, let G = (A,Win) and G ′ = (A′,Win′) be qual-
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itative games. We say that G is reducible to G ′ via the memory structureM
for A if A′ = A ×M and if ρ ∈ Win if and only if ext(ρ) ∈ Win′. Then,
Player 0 wins G if and only if she wins G ′. Moreover, if σ′ is a winning strat-
egy for Player 0 in G ′ that is implemented by M′, then a winning strategy
for her in G is implemented by M×M′.
We now define quantitative reductions as an analogous technique for the
study of quantitative games and show that they exhibit the same properties
as qualitative reductions. Intuitively, given two quantitative games G and G ′,
we aim to say that G is reducible to G ′ if plays in one game can be translated
into plays in the other, retaining their cost along the transformation. In fact,
two such associated plays do not need to carry identical cost, but it suffices
that the order on plays induced by their cost is retained.
To capture such order-retaining transformations of cost functions, we in-
troduce b-correction functions. Let b ∈ N∞. A function f : N∞ → N∞ is a
b-correction function if
• for all b′1 < b′2 < b we have f(b′1) < f(b′2),
• for all b′ < b we have f(b′) < f(b), and
• for all b′ ≥ b we have f(b′) ≥ f(b).
Thus, intuitively, a b-correction function is strictly monotonic up to, but not
including, b, and f(b) is a lower bound for all values f(b′) with b′ ≥ b.
For b =∞ these requirements degenerate to demanding that f is strictly
monotonic, which in turn implies f(∞) = ∞ and f(b) 6= ∞ for all b 6= ∞.
Dually, if b = 0, we only require that f(0) bounds the values of f(b) from
below. As an example, for each b ∈ N∞ we define the function capb as follows:
capb(b
′) =
{
min{b, b′} if b′ 6=∞ and
∞ otherwise .
Then, the function capb is a b-correction function.
Leveraging the notion of b-correction functions, we are now able to define
quantitative reductions. Let G = (A,Cost) and G ′ = (A′,Cost′) be quan-
titative games, let M be some memory structure for A, let b ∈ N∞, and
let f : N∞ → N∞ be some function. We say that G is b-reducible to G ′ viaM
and f if
• A′ = A×M,
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• f is a b-correction function,
• Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(Cost(ρ)) for all plays ρ of A with Cost(ρ) < b, and
• Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b) for all plays ρ of A with Cost(ρ) ≥ b.
We write G ≤bM,f G ′ in this case. Moreover, we use capb as a “default” func-
tion: If f = capb, we omit stating f explicitly and write G ≤bM G ′. The penul-
timate condition implies that for each play ext(ρ) in A′ with Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≤
f(b) there exists some b′ such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′). Clearly, quan-
titative reductions are downward-closed with respect to the parameter b:
If G ≤bM,f G ′ for some b ∈ N∞, then, for all b′ ≤ b, we have G ≤b′M,f G ′.
Qualitative reductions retain whether or not a play is winning. In quan-
titative games, the notion of winning is refined to the notion of cost of a
play. Hence, our next aim is to show that quantitative reductions indeed re-
tain the costs of strategies. To this end, we first demonstrate that correction
functions tie the cost of plays in G ′ to that of plays in G.
Lemma 1. Let G and G ′ be quantitative games such that G ≤bM,f G ′, for
some b ∈ N∞, some memory structureM, and some b-correction function f .
All of the following hold true for all b′ ∈ N and all plays ρ in G:
1. If b′ < b and Cost′(ext(ρ)) < f(b′), then Cost(ρ) < b′.
2. If b′ < b and Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′), then Cost(ρ) = b′.
3. If b′ < b and Cost′(ext(ρ)) > f(b′), then Cost(ρ) > b′.
4. If Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b), then Cost(ρ) ≥ b.
Proof. 1) Let b′ < b and let ρ be such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) < f(b′). Towards
a contradiction assume Cost(ρ) = b′′ ≥ b′. We have f(b′′) = f(Cost(ρ)) =
Cost′(ext(ρ)). If b′′ < b, then we obtain f(b′) ≤ f(b′′), which implies f(b′) ≤
Cost′(ext(ρ)), contradicting Cost′(ext(ρ)) < f(b′). If, however, b′′ ≥ b, then
Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′′) ≥ f(b) > f(b′), again contradicting Cost′(ext(ρ)) <
f(b′).
2) Let b′ < b and let ρ be such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′). Towards a con-
tradiction assume Cost(ρ) = b′′ 6= b′. We again have f(b′′) = Cost′(ext(ρ)).
First assume b′′ < b′. Then we have b′′ < b′ < b, which implies f(b′′) <
f(b′), contradicting Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′). If b′ < b′′ < b, we obtain the
contradiction Cost′(ext(ρ)) > f(b′) analogously. Finally, if b ≤ b′′, then
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Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′′) ≥ f(b) > f(b′), which again contradicts Cost′(ext(ρ)) =
f(b′).
3) Let b′ < b and let ρ be such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) > f(b′). Towards
a contradiction, assume Cost(ρ) ≤ b′. We then obtain f(Cost(ρ)) ≤ f(b′)
due to b′ < b and due to f being a b-correction function. Furthermore,
due to Cost(ρ) ≤ b′, we obtain Cost(ρ) < b. Hence, we have f(Cost(ρ)) =
Cost′(ext(ρ)) due to the third property from the definition of b-reducibility.
Since we furthermore have f(Cost(ρ)) ≤ f(b′) as argued above. This, in
turn, directly implies Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≤ f(b′), which contradicts the assumption
Cost′(ext(ρ)) > f(b′).
4) Let ρ be such that Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b). Towards a contradiction
assume Cost(ρ) = b′ < b. We again have f(b′) = Cost′(ext(ρ)). However, we
obtain f(b′) < f(b) due to f being a b-correction function. This contradicts
Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′) ≥ f(b).
These properties of correction functions when used in quantitative re-
ductions enable us to state and prove the main result of this section, which
establishes quantitative reductions as the quantitative counterpart of qual-
itative reductions: If G ≤b+1M,f G ′, then all plays of cost at most b in G are
“tracked” precisely in G ′. Hence, as long as the cost of a strategy in G is at
most b, it is possible to construct a strategy in G ′ with cost at most f(b).
This holds true for both players.
If a strategy has cost greater than b, however, we do not have a direct
correspondence between costs of plays in G and G ′ anymore. If, however, b
additionally is a cap of G, and if G is determined, then we can still show that
Player 1 has a strategy of infinite cost in G if he has a strategy of cost greater
than f(b) in G ′.
Theorem 2. Let G and G ′ be determined quantitative games with G ≤b+1M,f G ′
for some b, M, and f , where b ∈ N is a cap of G.
1. Let b′ < b+ 1. Player i has a strategy σ′ in G ′ with Cost′(σ′) = f(b′) if
and only if they have a strategy σ in G with Cost(σ) = b′.
2. If Player 1 has a strategy τ ′ in G ′ with Cost′(τ ′) ≥ f(b + 1), then he
has a strategy τ in G with Cost(τ) =∞.
Proof. 1) We first show the direction from left to right. To this end, let σ′ be
a strategy for Player i in G ′ with Cost′(σ′) = f(b′) for some b′ ≤ b. We define
the strategy σ for Player i in G for all play prefixes pi ending in a vertex in Vi
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via σ(pi) = v if σ′(ext(pi)) = (v,m) for some m ∈M and claim Cost(σ) = b′.
To this end, we first show Cost(σ) ≤ b′ for the case i = 0 and Cost(σ) ≥ b′
for the case i = 1.
Let ρ be an infinite play consistent with σ. A straightforward induction
shows that ρ′ = ext(ρ) is consistent with σ′. If i = 0, i.e., if σ is a strategy
for Player 0, then Cost′(ρ′) = Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≤ Cost′(σ′) = f(b′). Since we
furthermore have b′ < b + 1 by assumption and since f is a b + 1-correction
function, we obtain Cost(ρ) ≤ b′, due to Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 1.2. Since
we picked ρ arbitrarily from the plays consistent with σ, this in turn im-
plies Cost(σ) ≤ b′. If, however i = 1, we directly obtain Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b′)
due to Cost(σ) ≥ f(b′). Hence, we furthermore obtain Cost(ρ) ≥ b′ due to
Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.3. Since we again picked ρ arbitrarily from the
plays consistent with σ, this in turn implies Cost(σ) ≥ b′. It remains to
show Cost(σ) ≥ b′ for the case i = 0 and Cost(σ) ≤ b′ for the case i = 1.
First, since b′ < b + 1 < ∞, we obtain f(b′) < ∞: If f(b′) = ∞, we
obtain f(b′ + 1) = ∞, which contradicts strict monotonicity of f up to and
including b + 1 ≥ b′ + 1. Since Cost′(σ′) = f(b′) <∞, there exists a play ρ′
that is consistent with σ′ such that Cost′(ρ′) = f(b′).
Further, let ρ be the unique play such that ext(ρ) = ρ′. By induction, we
obtain that ρ is consistent with σ. Additionally, we have Cost(ρ) = b′ due
to Cost′(ρ′) = Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′) and Lemma 1.2. Hence, Cost(σ) ≥ b′
if i = 0, and Cost(σ) ≤ b′ if i = 1, which concludes the direction from left to
right.
In order to show the inverse direction of the statement, let σ be a strategy
in G with Cost(σ) = b′ < b + 1. We define the strategy σ′ for Player i in G ′
for all play prefixes ext(pi) = (v0,m0) · · · (vj,mj) ending in a vertex in Vi×M
as σ′(ext(pi)) = (v,Upd(mj, v)) if σ(pi) = v and claim Cost′(σ′) = f(b′).
Let ext(ρ) be a play consistent with σ′. A straightforward induction
yields that ρ is consistent with σ, hence, if i = 0, then Cost(ρ) ≤ b′ and thus
Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≤ f(b′) due to b′ < b + 1. Dually, if i = 1, then Cost(ρ) ≥ b′
and Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ f(b′). Hence, we obtain Cost′(σ′) ≤ f(b′) if i = 0 as
well as Cost′(σ′) ≥ f(b′) if i = 1. It remains to show Cost′(σ′) ≥ f(b′)
and Cost′(σ′) ≤ f(b′) in the former and latter case, respectively.
Now let ρ be a play consistent with σ such that Cost(ρ) = b′. Since b′ <
∞, such a play exists. Via another straightforward induction we obtain
that ext(ρ) is consistent with σ′. As Cost′(ext(ρ)) = f(b′), we furthermore
obtain Cost′(σ′) ≥ f(b′) if i = 0 and Cost′(σ′) ≤ f(b′) if i = 1, which
concludes the proof of this statement.
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2) Let τ ′ be a strategy for Player 1 in G ′ with Cost′(τ ′) ≥ f(b + 1).
We define the strategy τ for Player 1 in G via τ(pi) = v if τ ′(ext(pi)) =
(v,m) for all play prefixes pi in G. Let ρ be a play consistent with τ and
define ρ′ = ext(ρ). A straightforward induction yields that ρ′ is consistent
with τ ′. Since Cost′(τ ′) ≥ f(b + 1), we obtain Cost′(ρ′) ≥ f(b + 1). Then,
we obtain Cost(ρ) ≥ b + 1 due to Lemma 1.4. Since we picked ρ arbitrarily
from the plays consistent with τ , we directly obtain Cost(τ) ≥ b+ 1. Since b
is a cap of G and due to determinacy of G, this implies that there exists a
strategy τ ′′ for Player 1 in G such that Cost(τ ′′) =∞.
We proved Theorem 2 by constructing optimal strategies for Player 0 in G
from optimal strategies for her in G ′. These strategies use the set of all play
prefixes of G ′ as memory states and may thus be of infinite size. If Player 0
can achieve a certain cost in G ′ using a finite-state strategy, however, then
she can achieve the corresponding cost in G with a finite-state strategy as
well.
Theorem 3. Let G and G ′ be quantitative games such that G ≤bM1,f G ′ for
some b, M1, and f and let either b′ < b or b′ = b = ∞. If Player i has
a finite-state strategy σ′ with Cost′(σ′) = f(b′) in G ′ that is implemented
by M2, then she has a finite-state strategy σ with Cost(σ) = b′ in G that is
implemented by M1 ×M2.
Proof. Let G = (A,Cost), G ′ = (A′,Cost′),M1 = (M1,m1I ,Upd1), andM2 =
(M2,m
2
I ,Upd2) such that σ
′ is implemented byM2 with the next-move func-
tion Nxt′ : (V ×M1) ×M2 → (V ×M1). We define Nxt(v, (m1,m2)) = v∗
if Nxt′((v,m1),m2) = (v∗,Upd1(m1, v
∗)). We moreover define σ as the strat-
egy that is implemented by M1 ×M2 with the next-move function Nxt.
Let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play consistent with σ, let
extM1×M2(ρ) = (v0,m
0
1,m
0
2)(v1,m
1
1,m
1
2)(v2,m
2
1,m
2
2) · · ·
be its extension with respect to M1 ×M2, and let j ∈ N be such that vj ∈
Vi. We obtain vj+1 = σ(v0 · · · vj) = Nxt(vj, (mj1,mj2)). Due to the defi-
nition of Nxt, this implies Nxt′((vj,m
j
1),m
j
2) = (vj+1,m
j+1
1 ), where m
j+1
1 =
Upd1(m
j
1, vj+1) due to the construction ofA×M1. Hence, extM1(ρ) is consis-
tent with σ′, i.e., Cost′(extM1(ρ)) ≤ f(b′), which in turn implies Cost(ρ) ≤ b′
for i = 0 due to Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 1.2, and Cost′(extM1(ρ)) ≥ f(b′)
and Cost(ρ) ≥ b′ for i = 1.
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Due to similar reasoning, for each play extM1(ρ) consistent with σ
′, the
play ρ is consistent with σ. If i = 1 or b′ < ∞, this concludes the proof.
If, however, i = 0 and b′ = ∞, then we furthermore obtain that b = ∞
and that f is a strictly monotonic function with f(∞) = ∞. Hence, if
there exists a play extM1(ρ) consistent with σ
′ with Cost′(extM1(ρ)) = ∞,
then Cost(ρ) = ∞ and, hence, Cost(σ) = ∞. If, however, the costs of the
plays consistent with σ′ diverges, then the cost of the plays consistent with σ
diverges as well and we obtain Cost(σ) =∞.
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 show that quantitative reductions indeed ex-
hibit properties analogous to those of qualitative reductions in the quantita-
tive setting. Recall that in addition to retaining winning plays and to allowing
the implementation of finite-state strategies, qualitative reductions further-
more are transitive: If G, G ′, and G ′′ are qualitative games such that G ≤ G ′,
and such that G ′ ≤ G ′′, then G ≤ G ′′. We now show that quantitative reduc-
tions are transitive as well.
Theorem 4. Let G1,G2,G3 be quantitative games such that G1 ≤b1M1,f1 G2 and
G2 ≤b2M2,f2 G3 for some b1, b2 ∈ N∞, some memory structures M1,M2, and
some b1- and b2-correction functions f1 and f2, respectively.
Then, we have G1 ≤bM,f G3, whereM =M1×M2, f = f2◦f1, and b = b1
if b2 ≥ f1(b1) and b = max{b′ | f1(b′) ≤ b2} otherwise.
Proof. For each j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let Gj = (Aj,Costj). Recall that in order to
show G1 ≤bM,f G3 we have to show that
• A3 = A1 ×M1 ×M2,
• f2 ◦ f1 is a b-reduction function,
• for all plays ρ of A1 with Cost1(ρ) < b we have Cost3(extM1×M2(ρ)) =
(f2 ◦ f1)(Cost1(ρ)), and
• for all plays ρ of A1 with Cost1(ρ) ≥ b we have Cost3(extM1×M2(ρ)) ≥
(f2 ◦ f1)(b).
We show all these items individually.
Clearly, we have
A3 = A2 ×M2 = A1 ×M1 ×M2 .
We now show that f2 ◦ f1 is a b-correction function, for b defined as in
the statement of the theorem. Recall that to this end we have to show that
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• for all x < x′ < b we have (f2 ◦ f1)(x) < (f2 ◦ f1)(x′),
• for all x < b we have (f2 ◦ f1)(x) < (f2 ◦ f1)(b), and
• for all x ≥ b we have (f2 ◦ f1)(x) ≥ (f2 ◦ f1)(b).
Furthermore recall that we defined
b =
{
b1 if b2 ≥ f1(b1) and
max{b′ | f1(b′) ≤ b2} otherwise .
We treat both cases of this definition separately.
First, assume b2 ≥ f1(b1). In this case we have b = b1. We show the three
items of the definition of a b-correction function independently.
• First, pick x and x′ such that x < x′ < b = b1. We show (f2 ◦ f1)(x) <
(f2 ◦ f1)(x′). Since f1 is a b1-correction function, we obtain f1(x) <
f1(x
′), f1(x) < f1(b1), and f1(x′) < f1(b1). Since, furthermore, f2 is
a b2-correction function and as f1(b1) ≤ b2 by assumption, we moreover
obtain (f2 ◦ f1)(x) < (f2 ◦ f1)(x′).
• Now pick some x such that x < b = b1. We show (f2 ◦ f1)(x) < (f2 ◦
f1)(b). Since f1 is a b1-correction function, we directly obtain f1(x) <
f1(b1). Since f1(b1) ≤ b2 by assumption and since f2 is a b2-correction
function, this directly yields (f2 ◦ f1)(x) < (f2 ◦ f1)(b1) = (f2 ◦ f1)(b).
• Finally, pick some x such that x ≥ b = b1. Then f1(x) ≥ f1(b1), since,
again, f1 is a b1-correction function. If f1(x) < b2, then (f2 ◦ f1)(x) ≥
(f2 ◦ f1)(b1). If, however, f1(x) ≥ b2, then (f2 ◦ f1)(x) ≥ f2(b2) ≥
(f2 ◦ f1)(b1), where the latter inequality follows from the assumption
b2 ≥ f1(b1). This concludes this part of the proof.
Now assume b2 < f1(b1) and let b be maximal such that f1(b) ≤ b2. We
first argue that we have b ≤ b1 in this case. Towards a contradiction assume
b1 < b. This implies f1(b1) ≤ f1(b) due to f1 being a b1-correction function.
However, we have f1(b) ≤ b2 < f1(b1), where the former inequality results
from the definition of b, while the latter one is due to our initial assumption.
This directly contradicts f1(b1) ≤ f1(b), hence we obtain b ≤ b1.
We again show that f2 ◦f1 is a b-correction function by showing the three
items of the definition independently.
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• First, pick x and x′ such that x < x′ < b. Since b ≤ b1 we obtain
f1(x) < f1(x
′) < f1(b) due to f1 being a b1-correction function. As
f1(b) ≤ b2 due to the definition of b, we directly obtain (f2 ◦ f1)(x) <
(f2 ◦ f1)(x′).
• Now, pick x such that x < b. We obtain (f2 ◦ f1)(x) < (f2 ◦ f1)(b) via
reasoning analogous to the previous case.
• Finally, pick x such that b ≤ x. We show (f2 ◦ f1)(b) ≤ (f2 ◦ f1)(x).
To this end, we first observe that we have f1(b) ≤ f1(x) by leveraging
different properties of f1 being a b1-correction function, depending on
whether we have b ≤ x < b1 or b ≤ b1 ≤ x. The case b1 < b ≤ x
is excluded due to b ≤ b1 as argued above. We furthermore obtain
(f2◦f1)(b) ≤ (f2◦f1)(x) by similar reasoning, using different properties
of f2 being a b2-correction function, depending on whether we have
f1(b) ≤ b2 ≤ f1(x) or f1(b) ≤ f1(x) < f1(b2). Again, the case b2 <
f1(b) ≤ f1(x) is excluded due to the definition of b.
Thus, we have shown that f2 ◦ f1 is indeed a b-correction function. It
remains to prove the latter two conditions from the definition of G1 ≤bM,f G3.
We first aim to show that for all plays ρ of A1 with Cost1(ρ) < b we have
Cost3(extM1×M2(ρ)) = (f2 ◦ f1)(Cost1(ρ)). To this end, let ρ be a play of A1
with Cost1(ρ) < b. For the sake of consistency and readability, we define
ρ1 = ρ, ρ2 = extM1(ρ1), and ρ3 = extM2(ρ2) = extM1×M2(ρ1). We again
treat both cases of the definition of b separately.
We again first consider the case that b2 ≥ f1(b1). We then directly
obtain b = b1 due to the definition of b. This yields Cost1(ρ1) < b1,
which in turn implies f1(Cost1(ρ1)) = Cost2(ρ2) due to G1 ≤b1M1,f1 G2. Fur-
thermore, since Cost1(ρ1) < b1 and since f1 is a b1-correction function we
have f1(Cost1(ρ1)) < f1(b1), which directly yields Cost2(ρ2) < f1(b1) via
the equation above. Since f1(b1) ≤ b2, we further obtain Cost2(ρ2) < b2.
Due to G2 ≤b2M2,f2 G3 this then implies Cost3(ρ3) = f2(Cost2(ρ2)). By
again applying f1(Cost1(ρ1)) = Cost2(ρ2), we obtain the desired result of
Cost3(ρ3) = (f2 ◦ f1)(Cost1(ρ1)).
Now consider the case that b2 < f1(b1). In this case, we have b = max{b′ |
f1(b
′) ≤ b2} by definition of b. As argued above, we have b ≤ b1 in this case,
which directly implies Cost1(ρ1) < b1. Due to G1 ≤b1M1,f1 G2 this yields
f1(Cost1(ρ1)) = Cost2(ρ2). We also obtain f1(Cost1(ρ1)) < f1(b). Since
we again have f1(b) ≤ b2 by definition of b, we obtain the desired result of
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Cost3(ρ3) = (f2 ◦ f1)(Cost1(ρ1)) via reasoning analogously to the previous
case.
It remains to show the final item in the definition of b-reducibility, i.e.,
that we indeed have Cost3(extM1×M2(ρ)) ≥ (f2 ◦f1)(Cost1(ρ)) for all plays ρ
of A1 with Cost1(ρ) ≥ b. To this end, let ρ be a play of A1 with Cost1(ρ) ≥ b.
For the sake of brevity and consistency we again define ρ1 = ρ, ρ2 = extM1(ρ),
and ρ3 = extM2(ρ2) = extM1×M2(ρ1). We again treat the two cases from the
definition of b separately.
First, assume b2 ≥ f1(b1). We directly obtain b = b1 by definition of b,
which in turn implies Cost2(ρ2) ≥ f1(b1) due to G1 ≤b1M1,f1 G2. If b2 >
Cost2(ρ2), then we directly obtain f2(Cost2(ρ2)) ≥ (f2 ◦ f1)(b1) since f2 is
a b2-correction function. Since we have G2 ≤b2M2,f2 G3, we moreover obtain
f2(Cost2(ρ2)) = Cost3(ρ3), which in turn yields Cost3(ρ3) ≥ (f2 ◦ f1)(b1) =
(f2 ◦f1)(b). If, however, Cost2(ρ2) ≥ b2 ≥ f1(b1), then we obtain Cost3(ρ3) ≥
f2(b2) ≥ (f2 ◦ f1)(b1) = (f2 ◦ f1)(b), where the former inequality is implied
by G2 ≤b2M2,f2 G3 while we obtain the latter due to f2 being a b2-correction
function. Since the final case, i.e., the case Cost2(ρ2) ≥ f1(b1) > b2 would
contradict our initial assumption b2 ≥ f1(b1), this concludes the first case of
this proof.
Now consider the case b2 < f1(b1). Here, we again distinguish two sub-
cases. If Cost1(ρ1) ≥ b1, then we obtain Cost2(ρ2) ≥ f1(b1) > b2 ≥ f1(b).
The three inequalities result from G1 ≤b1M1,f1 G2, from the assumption above,
and from the definition of b, respectively. We furthermore obtain Cost3(ρ3) ≥
f2(b2) ≥ (f2 ◦ f1)(b), where the former inequality is due to G2 ≤b2M2,f2 G3 and
Cost2(ρ2) > b2, while the latter one results from f2 being a b2-correction
function and from b2 ≥ f1(b).
It remains to consider the case b1 > Cost1(ρ1). In this case, we directly
obtain Cost2(ρ2) = f1(Cost1(ρ1)) ≥ f1(b). The former equality is due to
G1 ≤b1M1,f1 G2, while the latter results from the assumption Cost1(ρ1) ≥ b and
the fact that f1 is a b1-correction function. We again distinguish two cases
based on the relation of b2 to f1(b) and Cost2(ρ2): Either we have Cost2(ρ2) ≥
b2 ≥ f1(b), or we have b2 > Cost2(ρ2) ≥ f1(b). In the former case, we obtain
Cost3(ρ3) ≥ f2(b2) ≥ (f2 ◦ f1)(b), where the former and latter inequality are
due to G2 ≤b2M2,f2 G3 and due to f2 being a b2-reduction function, respectively.
In the latter case, we similarly obtain f2(Cost2(ρ2)) = Cost3(ρ3) ≥ (f2◦f1)(b),
where the former equality again results from G2 ≤b2G2,f2 G3, while the latter
inequality is again due to f2 being a b2-correction function.
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By using quantitative reductions we are able to structure the space of
quantitative games similarly to that of qualitative games. While for qualita-
tive games, there exist direct solutions to a number of well-studied winning
conditions, for quantitative games, no such direct solutions for the threshold
problems exist to the best of our knowledge. Instead, the threshold problem
for quantitative games is usually solved by reducing the quantitative game
to a qualitative game for a fixed bound b.
Hence, there does not yet exist a “foundation” of the space of quantitative
winning conditions analogous to that of the space of qualitative winning
conditions, i.e., there is no canonical simple class of quantitative games that
provides a natural target for quantitative reductions. In the following section,
we provide such a foundation in the form of vertex-ranked games.
4. Vertex-Ranked Games
We introduce two very simple kinds of quantitative games, which we call
vertex-ranked games. In such games, the cost of a play is determined solely
by a qualitative winning condition and a ranking of the vertices of the arena
by natural numbers. We show that solving the threshold problem for either
kind of game is possible with only a polynomial overhead over solving the
underlying qualitative game.
Furthermore, we show that the memory structures implementing winning
strategies for either player only incur a polynomial overhead in comparison to
the memory structures implementing winning strategies for the underlying
conditions. Finally, we briefly discuss the optimization problem for such
games, i.e., the problem of determining the minimal b such that Player 0 has
a strategy of cost at most b in such a game. We argue that determining such b
incurs only a polynomial overhead over solving the underlying qualitative
game.
Let A be an arena with vertex set V , let Win ⊆ (V ′)ω be a qualitative
winning condition, and let rk : V → N be a ranking function on vertices. We
define the quantitative vertex-ranked sup-condition
Ranksup(Win, rk) : v0v1v2 · · · 7→{
supj→∞ rk(vj) if v0v1v2 · · · ∈Win and
∞ otherwise ,
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as well as its prefix-independent version, the vertex-ranked lim sup-condition
Ranklim(Win, rk) : v0v1v2 · · · 7→{
lim supj→∞ rk(vj) if v0v1v2 · · · ∈Win and
∞ otherwise .
A vertex-ranked sup- or lim sup-game G = (A,RankX(Win, rk)) with
X ∈ {sup, lim} consists of an arenaA with vertex set V , a qualitative winning
condition Win, and a vertex-ranking function rk: V → N.
If GX = (A,RankX(Win, rk)) is a vertex-ranked sup- or lim sup-game, we
call the game (A,Win) the qualitative game corresponding to GX . Moreover,
if Gsup is a vertex-ranked sup-game, we denote the vertex-ranked lim sup-
game with the same arena, winning condition, and rank function by Glim
and vice versa. In either case, we denote the corresponding qualitative game
by G.
Before showing how to solve vertex-ranked sup- and lim sup-games, we
argue that these games allow straightforward adaptations of qualitative win-
ning conditions to quantitative ones. This is witnessed by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. Let G = (A,Win) and G ′ = (A′,Win′) be qualitative games
and let M be a memory structure such that G ≤M G ′. Moreover, let rk be a
ranking function on vertices of G and let b be the maximal rank assigned to a
vertex of G by rk. Then, Gsup ≤b+1M G ′sup, where Gsup = (A,Ranksup(Win, rk))
and G ′sup = (A′,Ranksup(Win′, rk′)) with rk′(v,m) = rk(v).
Proof. Clearly, we have A′ = A ×M due to G ≤ G ′. Moreover, as argued
above, capb+1 is a b + 1-correction function. Hence, it remains to show that
the latter two conditions in the definition of a quantitative reduction are
satisfied.
To this end, let ρ be a play in A. If the cost of ρ is less than b+1, then we
obtain ρ ∈Win by definition of b and by definition of the vertex-ranked sup-
condition. This, in turn, implies ext(ρ) ∈ Win′ due to G ≤ G ′. Hence, we
obtain
capb+1(Rank
sup(Win, rk)(ρ)) = Ranksup(Win, rk)(ρ) =
Ranksup(Win′, rk′)(ext(ρ)) .
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If, however, the cost of ρ is at least b + 1, then we have ρ /∈ Win, again
due to the definition of b, which implies both Ranksup(Win, rk)(ρ) = ∞ as
well as ext(ρ) /∈Win due to G ≤ G ′. Hence, we obtain
Ranksup(Win′, rk′)(ext(ρ)) =∞ ≥ capb+1(b+ 1) = b+ 1 ,
which concludes the proof of the fourth condition of quantitative reductions.
Clearly, the above proof can be adapted in a very straightforward way to
show the analogous result for the case of vertex-ranked lim sup-games.
Remark 6. Let G = (A,Win) and G ′ = (A′,Win′) be qualitative games and
let M be a memory structure such that G ≤M G ′. Moreover, let rk be a
ranking function on vertices of G and let b be the maximal rank assigned to a
vertex of G by rk. Then, Glim ≤b+1M G ′lim, where Glim = (A,Ranklim(Win, rk))
and G ′lim = (A′,Ranklim(Win′, rk′)) with rk′(v,m) = rk(v).
The remainder of this section is dedicated to providing bounds on the
complexity of solving vertex-ranked games with respect to some given bound.
In particular, we show that vertex-ranked sup-games can be solved with
only an additive linear blowup compared to the complexity of solving the
corresponding qualitative games. Vertex-ranked lim sup-games, on the other
hand, can be solved while incurring only a polynomial blowup compared to
solving the corresponding qualitative games.
4.1. Solving Vertex-Ranked sup-Games
We begin by observing that solving vertex-ranked sup-games is at least
as hard as solving the underlying qualitative games, since the former sub-
sumes the latter. This is due to the fact that Player 0 has a winning strat-
egy in (A,Win) if and only if she has a strategy with cost at most zero
in (A,Ranksup(Win, rk)), where rk is the constant function assigning zero
to every vertex.
We now turn our attention to finding an upper bound for the complexity
of the threshold problem for vertex-ranked sup-games. To achieve a general
treatment of such games, we first introduce some notation. LetG be a class of
qualitative games. We define the extension of G to vertex-ranked sup-games
as
Grnksup = {(A,Ranksup(Win, rk)) |
(A,Win) ∈ G, rk is vertex-ranking function for A} .
21
We first show that we can use a decision procedure solving games from G
to solve games from Grnksup with respect to a given b. To this end, we remove
all vertices from which Player 1 can enforce a visit to a vertex of rank greater
than b and proclaim that Player 0 wins the quantitative game with respect
to b if and only if she wins the qualitative game corresponding to the re-
sulting quantitative game. To ensure that we are able to solve the resulting
qualitative game, we assume some closure properties of G. To this end, we
first introduce some notation.
Let G be a qualitative or quantitative game with vertex set V . For
each v ∈ V , we write Gv to denote the game G with its initial vertex re-
placed by v. All other components, i.e., the structure of the arena and
the cost-function, remain unchanged. Let A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI) and A′ =
(V ′, V ′0 , V
′
1 , E
′, v′I) be arenas. We say that A′ is a sub-arena of A if V ′ ⊆ V ,
V ′0 ⊆ V0, V ′1 ⊆ V1, E ′ ⊆ E, and vI = v′I and write A′ v A in this case.
We call a class of qualitative (or quantitative) games G proper if
• for each (A,Win) (or (A,Cost)) in G and each sub-arena A′ v A the
game (A′,Win′) (or (A′,Cost′)), where Win′ (or Cost′) is the restriction
of Win (or Cost) to plays from A′, is a member of G as well, if
• for each game G ∈ G and each vertex v of G we have Gv ∈ G, if
• all games in G are determined, and if
• all G ∈ G are finitely representable.
Intuitively, the first condition ensures that games obtained by removing ver-
tices or edges from games in G are members of G as well, whereas the latter
three conditions are very weak technical requirements. In particular the re-
quirement that all games included in the class must be finitely representable
serves mainly to enable us to talk about the size of a game.
Using this notion of proper classes of games, we are now able to formulate
the main result of this section regarding vertex-ranked sup-games.
Theorem 7. Let G be a proper class of qualitative games G that can be solved
in time t(|G|) and space s(|G|), where t and s are monotonic functions.
Then, the following problem can be solved in time O(n)+ t(|G|) and space
O(n) + s(|G|): “Given some game Gsup ∈ Grnksup with n vertices and some
bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 win Gsup with respect to b?”
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Intuitively, in order to prove Theorem 7, we show that Player 0 wins Gsup ∈
Grnksup with respect to some bound b if and only if
• Player 1 cannot enforce a visit to vertices of rank greater than b from vI ,
and if
• she is able to win the game Gsup without visiting any vertices from
which Player 1 is able to enforce a visit to a vertex of rank greater
than b.
We formalize the idea of removing vertices from which one player can
enforce a visit to some set of vertices by first recalling the attractor construc-
tion. Let A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI) be an arena with n vertices and let X ⊆ V .
We define Attri(X) = Attr
n
i (X) inductively with Attr
0
i (X) = X and
Attrji (X) = {v ∈ Vi | ∃v′ ∈ Attrj−1i (X). (v, v′) ∈ E}∪
{v ∈ V1−i | ∀(v, v′) ∈ E. v′ ∈ Attrj−1i (X)} ∪ Attrj−1i (X) .
Intuitively, the i-attractor Attri(X) is the set of all vertices from which
Player i can enforce a visit to X. The set Attri(X) can be computed in
linear time in |E| and Player i has a positional strategy σ such that each
play starting in some vertex in Attri(X) and consistent with σ eventually
encounters some vertex from X [25]. We call σ an attractor strategy to-
wards X.
We furthermore formalize the notion of removing attractors from arenas:
Let A be an arena with vertex set V , let X ⊆ V , and let A = Attri(X).
If vI /∈ A, then we define
A \ A = (V \ A, V0 \ A, V1 \ A, {(v, v′) ∈ E | v /∈ A and v′ /∈ A}, vI) ,
which is again an arena. We lift this notation to qualitative (and quantita-
tive) games G = (A,Win) (or (A,Cost)) by defining G \ A = (A \ A,Win ∩
(V \A)ω) (or (A\A, Cost|(V \A)ω), where Cost|(V \A)ω denotes the restriction
of Cost to the domain (V \ A)ω). This restriction of the winning condition
and the cost fuction to vertices of V is not strictly necessary due to our def-
inition of Win ⊆ (V ′)ω and of Cost : (V ′)ω → N∞, but it makes the resulting
objects easier to reason about.
If vI ∈ A, however, then both A \A and G \A are undefined. The game
G \ A can be constructed in linear time and is of size at most |G|.
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As a first step towards the proof of Theorem 7, we show that vertex-
ranked sup-games can be solved by using a single attractor construction
and considering the qualitative game obtained by removing the resulting
attractor.
Lemma 8. Let G be a proper class of qualitative games, let Gsup = (A,Ranksup(Win, rk)) ∈
Grnksup with vertex set V and initial vertex vI , and let b ∈ N.
Player 0 has a strategy with cost at most b in Gsup if and only if vI /∈ A
and if she has a winning strategy in the qualitative game G ′ = G \ A, where
G = (A,Win) and A = Attr1({v ∈ V | rk(v) > b}).
Proof. Let Xb = {v ∈ V | rk(v) > b}. We first show the direction from right
to left, i.e., that, if vI /∈ A and if Player 0 wins G ′, say with strategy σ′, then
she has a strategy of cost at most b in Gsup. To this end, define A′ = A \ A.
Since A′ v A, the strategy σ′ is a strategy for Player 0 in Gsup as well, due
to Player 0 being able to keep the play inside A′ using σ′. Hence, each play
consistent with σ′ in G ′ is consistent with σ′ in G as well as vice versa. Let ρ
be a play in Gsup consistent with σ′. Since σ′ is winning for Player 0 in G ′,
we have ρ ∈Win∩ (V \A)ω ⊆Win. Moreover, since Xb ⊆ A, and as ρ visits
only vertices occurring in G ′, we obtain Ranksup(Win, rk)(ρ) ≤ b and thus
Cost(σ′) ≤ b, which concludes this direction of the proof.
We show the other direction via contraposition: To this end, first as-
sume vI ∈ A and let τA be an attractor strategy towards Xb for Player 1. We
show that Player 0 does not have a strategy with cost at most b in Gsup by
showing that τA has cost exceeding b. We obtain Cost(τA) > b in Gsup: By
playing consistently with τA, Player 1 forces the play to eventually reach
a vertex in Xb, i.e., a vertex v with rk(v) > b. Thus, Cost(τA) > b,
i.e., Cost(σ) > b for all strategies σ of Player 0.
Now assume that Player 0 does not have a winning strategy in G ′. To-
wards a contradiction, assume that she has a strategy σ with cost at most b
in Gsup. We first observe that no play consistent with σ visits any ver-
tex from A. Otherwise, playing consistently with his attractor strategy to-
wards Xb from the first visit to A, Player 1 would be able to construct a
play consistent with σ, but with cost greater than b. Thus, σ is a strat-
egy for Player 0 in G ′ and we obtain that all plays consistent with σ in A
are consistent with σ in A′ and vice versa. Since Cost(σ) ≤ b, we ob-
tain Ranksup(Win, rk)(ρ) <∞, i.e., ρ ∈Win for all plays ρ consistent with σ.
Thus, σ is a winning strategy for Player 0 in G ′, a contradiction.
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Using this lemma, we are able to construct a decision procedure solving
games from Grnksup using a decision procedure solving games from G.
Proof of Theorem 7. Since G is proper, Grnksup is proper as well. Given the
vertex-ranked sup-game Gsup = (A,Ranksup(Win, rk)), let Xb = {v ∈ V |
rk(v) > b} and let A = Attr1(Xb). We define the decision procedure decsup
deciding the given problem such that it returns false if vI ∈ A. Other-
wise, decsup returns true if and only if Player 0 wins G \ A. Since Grnksup is
proper and due to the assumption of the theorem, G \ A can be solved in
time at most t(|G|) and space at most s(|G|). The procedure decsup indeed
decides the given decision problem due to Lemma 8.
Since we can compute and remove the Player-1-attractor A in linear time
in |A| [25], the decision procedure decsup indeed requires time O(|A|)+ t(|G|)
and space O(|A|) + s(|G|).
This theorem provides an upper bound on the complexity of solving
vertex-ranked sup-games. Intuitively, we prove Theorem 7 by showing that,
for any vertex-ranked sup-game Gsup, a winning strategy for Player 0 in G
that never moves to the Player 1-attractor towards vertices of rank greater
than b has cost at most b. Thus, an upper bound on the size of winning strate-
gies for Player 0 for games from G provides an upper bound for strategies of
finite cost in Grnksup as well. Moreover, if the decision procedure deciding G
constructs winning strategies for one or both players, we can adapt the deci-
sion procedure deciding Grnksup to construct strategies of cost at most (greater
than) b for Player 0 (Player 1) as well.
Corollary 9. Let Gsup be a proper class of vertex-ranked sup-games and
let Gsup ∈ Gsup. If σ is a finite-state winning strategy for Player i in G,
then Player i has a finite-state winning strategy σsup in Gsup with |σsup| ∈
O(|σ|). Furthermore, if σ is effectively constructible, then σsup is effectively
constructible.
Finally, the procedure constructed in the proof of Theorem 7 enables us
to solve the optimization problem for vertex-ranked sup-games from Grnksup :
Recall that if Player 0 wins Gsup with respect to some b, she wins it with
respect to all b′ ≥ b as well. Hence, using a binary search, log(M) invocations
of the decision procedure from the proof of Theorem 7 suffice to determine the
minimal b such that Player 0 wins Gsup with respect to b, where M denotes the
number of ranks assigned to vertices of Gsup by its ranking function. Hence,
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it is possible to determine the minimal such b in time O(log(M)(n+ t(|G|)))
and space O(M) + s(|G|).
4.2. Solving Vertex-Ranked lim sup-Games
We now turn our attention to solving vertex-ranked lim sup-games. Solv-
ing these games is again at least as hard as solving their corresponding qual-
itative games, due to the same reasoning as for vertex-ranked sup-games.
Thus, we again only provide upper bounds on the complexity of solving such
games. To this end, given some class G of games, we define the corresponding
class of vertex-ranked lim sup-games
Grnklim = {(A,Ranklim(Win, rk)) |
(A,Win) ∈ G, rk is vertex-ranking function for A} .
We identify two criteria on classes of qualitative games G, each of which
is sufficient for quantitative games in Grnklim to be solvable with respect to
some given b. More precisely, we provide decision procedures for Grnklim for
the case that
• games from G can be solved in conjunction with coBu¨chi-conditions,
and for the case that
• the winner of a play ρ in a game from G depends only on an infinite
suffix of ρ.
In order to show the former case, fix some class of games G and let Glim =
(A,Ranklim(Win, rk)) ∈ Grnklim be a vertex-ranked lim sup-game with vertex
set V . Furthermore, recall that a play in Win has cost at most b in Glim if it
visits vertices of rank greater than b only finitely often.
In the qualitative case, the behavior of visiting a certain set of vertices
only finitely often is formalized by the qualitative co-Bu¨chi condition
CoBu¨chi(F ) = {ρ ∈ V ω | inf(ρ) ∩ F = ∅} ,
where inf(ρ) denotes the set of vertices occurring infinitely often in ρ. Clearly,
Player 0 has a strategy of cost at most b in Glim if and only if she wins (A,Win∩
CoBu¨chi({v ∈ V | rk(v) > b})). This observation gives rise to the following
remark.
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Remark 10. Let G be a class of qualitative games such that the games
in {(A,Win ∩ CoBu¨chi(F )) | (A,Win) ∈ G, F ⊆ V, V is vertex set of A}
can be solved in time t(|G|, |F |) and space s(|G|, |F |), where t and s are mono-
tonic functions.
Then, the following problem can be solved in time t(|Glim|, n) and space
s(|Glim|, n): “Given some game Glim ∈ Grnklim with n vertices as well as some
bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 win Glim with respect to b?”
In this case, we solve vertex-ranked lim sup-games via a decision proce-
dure for solving qualitative games as-is. Such a procedure trivially exists if
the winning conditions of games from G are closed under intersection with
co-Bu¨chi conditions. Thus, we obtain solvability of a wide range of classes of
vertex-ranked lim sup-games, e.g., co-Bu¨chi-, parity-, Muller-, Streett- and
Rabin games.
We now turn our attention to the latter case described above: We consider
classes Grnklim where a play is only determined to be winning or losing in a
game from G due to some infinite suffix. Formally, we say that a qualitative
winning condition Win ⊆ V ω is prefix-independent if for all infinite plays ρ ∈
V ω and all play prefixes pi ∈ V ∗, we have ρ ∈ Win if and only if piρ ∈ Win.
A qualitative game is prefix-independent if its winning condition is prefix-
independent. A class of games is prefix-independent if every game in the class
is prefix-independent. This notion allows us to formalize the claim made in
the second bullet point above.
Theorem 11. Let G be a proper prefix-independent class of qualitative games
where each G ∈ G can be solved in time t(|G|) and space s(|G|), where t and s
are monotonic functions.
Then, the following problem can be solved in time O(n3 + n2 · t(|Glim|))
and space O(n + s(|Glim|)): “Given some game Glim ∈ Grnklim with n vertices
and some bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 win Glim with respect to b?”
Let G be a proper prefix-independent class of games and let Glim ∈ Grnklim .
Moreover, let b ∈ N. Intuitively, in order to solve the b-threshold problem
for Glim, we adapt the classic algorithm for solving prefix-independent qualita-
tive games (cf., e.g., the work by Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman [26]).
Thereby, we repeatedly compute the set of vertices from which Player 0 has a
strategy of cost at most b in the corresponding vertex-ranked sup-game Gsup
and remove their 0-attractor from the game similarly to the construction of
a decision procedure for vertex-ranked sup-games in the proof of Theorem 7.
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We claim that Player 0 has a strategy with cost at most b in Glim if and only
if vI was removed during that above construction.
In order to prove Theorem 11, we first show that, if Player 0 does not
win a sup-game from any vertex, then she also does not win the correspond-
ing lim sup-game from any vertex. Recall that for a qualitative or quantita-
tive game G with vertex set V we write Gv to denote the game G with its
initial vertex replaced by v ∈ V . All other components, i.e., the structure
of the arena and the cost-function, remain unchanged. We write Wbi (G) to
denote the set of all vertices v such that Player i has a strategy of cost at
most b, if i = 0, or greater than b, if i = 1, in Gv.
Lemma 12. Let Glim = (A,Ranklim(Win, rk)) be a vertex-ranked lim sup-
game with vertex set V such that Win is prefix-independent and such that for
each v ∈ V the vertex-ranked sup-game (Gsup)v is determined. If Wb0(Gsup) =
∅, then Wb0(Glim) = ∅.
Proof. Let V be the vertex set of Gsup and Glim. Since Wb0(Gsup) = ∅ and
since for all v ∈ V the game (Gsup)v is determined, we obtain Wb1(Gsup) = V .
For each v ∈ V , let τ ′v be a strategy for Player 1 in (Gsup)v with cost greater
than b. We now define a single strategy τ for Player 1 in Glim with cost
greater than b. For each pi = v0 · · · vj ∈ V ∗ we define τ(pi) = τ ′vk(vk · · · vj),
where k = max{k′ | rk(vk′−1) > b}, with max ∅ = 0. We claim that τ has
cost greater than b in all (Glim)v. Since the cost-function Cost is identical in
all (Glim)v this claim is formalized as Cost(τ) > b.
Let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play of Gv consistent with τ . If there are infinitely
many positions j with rk(vj) > b, then Cost(ρ) > b. Thus, assume the
opposite and let j be the maximal position with rk(vj) > b. Then the
suffix ρ′ = vj+1vj+2vj+3 · · · of ρ is consistent with τ ′vj+1 . Since ρ′ does not
encounter any vertices of rank greater than b, while Cost(ρ′) > b due to ρ′
being consistent with a strategy of cost greater than b, we obtain ρ′ /∈Win.
This implies ρ /∈Win due to prefix-independence of Win. Hence, Cost(ρ) =
∞, which, together with the statement above, implies Cost(τ) > b.
We are now able to prove Theorem 11 using Lemma 12 as a building
block for showing the correctness of the approach outlined above.
Proof of Theorem 11. Given Glim = (A,Ranklim(Win, rk)) with vertex set V
of size n, we define G0 = Gsup, as well as Xj = Wb0(Gj), Aj = Attr0(Xj), which
is computed in the arena of Gj, and Gj+1 = Gj \Aj for all j ∈ N. As we only
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remove vertices from the games Gj, we obtain Gj+1 v Gj. Thus, the series
of games stabilizes at j = n at the latest, i.e., Gj = Gn for all j ≥ n. We
define A =
⋃
j≤nAj and G ′ = Gn and claim that Player 0 has a strategy with
cost at most b in G if and only if vI ∈ A. We first argue that this suffices to
show the desired result.
First note that since G is proper, Grnksup is proper as well. Thus, Theorem 7
is applicable to Grnksup . Let decsup be the decision procedure deciding whether
or not Player 0 has a strategy with cost at most b in games from Grnksup , as
constructed in the proof of that theorem. The decision procedure decsup can
be easily modified to return W b0 (Gj) instead of a yes/no-answer by applying it
to each (Gj)v individually. This, however, is only possible since we assume G
to be proper, as the second condition of the definition of a proper family of
games allows us to solve each (Gj)v. This modified procedure dec′sup runs in
time at most O(n2+n·t(|G|)) and space O(n)+s(|G|), where t(|G|) and s(|G|)
are the time and space required to solve G, respectively.
For j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the decision procedure declim first computes Gj in lin-
ear time in n and reusing the space used for solving Gj−1. It then computesXj
requiring a single call to the modified decsup. It subsequently computes Aj
in time O(n) and space O(n). Finally, it returns false if and only if vI is in
the arena of Gn. In total, we obtain a runtime of declim of O(n3 +n2 · t(|G|)).
The only additional memory required by declim is that for storing the sets Xj
and Aj, the size of which is bounded from above by n. The games Gj can be
stored by reusing the memory occupied by G, due to Gj v Gj−1. Hence, the
procedure declim requires space O(n) + s(|G|).
It remains to show that Player 0 indeed has a strategy with cost at most b
in G if and only if vI /∈ An, i.e., if vI ∈ A. To this end, first assume vI ∈ A
and note that we have Aj ⊇ Xj. However, for each two j 6= j′, we have
Aj ∩ Aj′ = ∅ and, in particular, Xj ∩Xj′ = ∅. Hence, for each v ∈ A there
exists a unique j such that v ∈ Aj.
We define the strategy σ for Player 0 in G inductively such that any play
consistent with σ only descends through the Xj. Formally, we construct σ
such that it satisfies the following invariant:
Let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play consistent with σ and let k ∈ N.
If vk ∈ Aj \ Xj, then vk+1 ∈
⋃
j′≤j Aj′ ∪ Xj′ . Moreover, if vk ∈
(Aj \ Xj) ∩ V0, then the move to vk+1 is the move prescribed
by the attractor strategy of Player 0 towards Xj. If vk ∈ Xj,
then vk+1 ∈ Xj ∪
⋃
j′<j Aj′ ∪Xj′ .
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Clearly, this invariant holds true for pi = vI . Thus, let pi = v0 · · · vk be a play
prefix consistent with σ. If vk ∈ V1, let v∗ be an arbitrary successor of vk in G
and assume towards a contradiction that piv∗ violates the invariant. If vk ∈
Aj \Xj, then in Gj there exists an edge from vk leading to some vertex v∗ /∈
Aj, a contradiction to the definition of the attractor. If, however, vk ∈ Xj
and v∗ /∈ Xj ∪
⋃
j′<j Aj′ ∪Xj′ , then Player 1 has a strategy τ in (Gj)v∗ with
cost greater than b. Thus, a play that begins in vk, moves to v
∗ and is
consistent with τ afterwards has cost greater b, i.e., Player 0 does not have a
strategy with cost at most b in (Gj)vk , a contradiction to vk ∈ Xj = Wb0(Gj).
Hence, piv∗ satisfies the invariant for each successor v∗ of vk ∈ V1.
Now assume vk ∈ V0 and first let v0 ∈ Aj ∪ Xj for some j ∈ N. Let σAj
be an attractor strategy for Player 0 towards Xj. If vk ∈ Aj \ Xj, we
define σ(pi) = σAj (vk), which satisfies the invariant due to the definition
of the attractor strategy. If, however, vk ∈ Xj, let k′ be minimal such
that vk′′ ∈ Xj for all k′′ with k′ ≤ k′′ ≤ k. Moreover, let σvj be a strat-
egy for Player 0 such that every play consistent with σvj in Gj with initial
vertex v has cost at most b. Such a strategy exists due to Xj = W
b
0(Gj). We
define σ(pi) = σ
vk′
j (vk′ · · · vk), which satisfies the invariant to similar reasoning
as above.
In order to show Cost(σ) ≤ b, let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play consistent
with σ. Due to the invariant of σ and since v0 ∈ A, the play ρ descends
through the Aj and the Xj, i.e., once it encounters some Xj, it never moves
to any Aj′ \Xj′ with j′ ≥ j nor to any Xj′ with j′ > j. Also, ρ stabilizes in
some Xj, i.e., there exists a k ∈ N such that vk′ ∈ Xj for all k′ ≥ k, as σ pre-
scribes moves according to the attractor strategy towards Xj when in Aj\Xj.
Moreover, due to the definition of σ, the suffix ρ′ = vkvk+1vk+2 · · · is consis-
tent with σvkj , i.e., we obtain ρ
′ ∈Win and that the maximal vertex-rank en-
countered in ρ is at most b. As Win is prefix-independent, we obtain ρ ∈Win
as well as lim supk→∞ rk(vk) ≤ b. Hence, Ranklim(Win, rk)(ρ) ≤ b, which
concludes this direction of the proof.
Now assume vI /∈ A and consider G ′ with vertex set V \ A. Since the
construction of the Gj stabilized, we have Aj = Xj = W b0 (G ′) = ∅, i.e.,
Player 1 has a strategy with cost greater than b from any starting vertex
in G ′. Due to Lemma 12, this implies that he has such a strategy from
every vertex in Gsup \ A, call it τ . Note that there exists no Player-0-vertex
in V \A that has an outgoing edge leading into A, as this would contradict the
definition of the Player-0-attractors Aj. Hence, τ is a strategy for Player 1
in G as well and we retain Cost(τ) > b.
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Intuitively, we prove Theorem 11 by constructing a strategy σ for Player 0
by “stitching together” the attractor-strategies towards her winning regions
in the decreasing vertex-ranked sup-games and the winning strategies for
her in the respective vertex-ranked sup-games. As each play consistent with
that strategy descends down the hierarchy of sup-games thus constructed, we
can reuse the memory states of the winning strategies in these games when
implementing σ. Thus, a monotonic upper bound on the size of strategies
with cost at most b in Gsup is an upper bound on the size of such strategies
in Glim as well.
Corollary 13. Let G be a proper prefix-independent class of qualitative
games such that, if Player 0 wins G, then she has a finite-state winning
strategy of size at most m(|G|), where m is a monotonic function.
If Player 0 wins Glim ∈ Grnklim , then she has a finite-state winning strat-
egy σlim with |σlim| ∈ O(m(|Glim|)) in Glim. Furthermore, if winning strategies
for Player 0 in the games in G are effectively constructible, then σlim is ef-
fectively constructible.
Moreover, in order to find the optimal b such that Player 0 wins Glim
with respect to b, we can again employ a binary search analogously to the
case of vertex-ranked sup-games. Thus, we can determine the optimal such b
in time O(log(M)(n3 + n2 · t(|Glim|))) and space O(n + s(|Glim|)), where M
again denotes the number of ranks assigned to vertices in a given vertex-
ranked lim sup-game.
Having thus defined both quantitative reductions and a canonical target
for such reductions, we now give examples of how to solve quantitative games
using this tools.
5. Applications
In this section, we give examples of how to use quantitative reductions and
vertex-ranked games to solve quantitative games. First, in Section 5.1, we
formally introduce a quantitative variant of request-response games, which
we call request-response games with costs, and show how to solve such games
using quantitative reductions and vertex-ranked sup-request-response games.
Second, in Section 5.2, we recall the definition of quantitative Muller games
due to McNaughton [22] and show how to reduce such games to vertex-
ranked safety games via quantitative reductions. Finally, in Section 5.3, we
show that vertex-ranked games are useful in their own right, by showing how
to use them to synthesize controllers that are resilient against disturbances.
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5.1. Reducing Request-Response Games with Costs to Vertex-Ranked Request-
Response Games
Recall that a play satisfies the qualitative request-response condition if
every request that is opened is eventually answered. We extend this con-
dition to a quantitative one by equipping the edges of the arena with costs
and measuring the maximal cost incurred between opening and answering a
request.
Fix some arena A with vertex set V and set E of edges. Formally, the
qualitative request-response condition ReqRes(Γ) consists of a family of so-
called request-response pairs Γ = (Qc, Pc)c∈[d], where d ∈ N, d > 0, and
where Qc, Pc ⊆ V for all c ∈ [d]. Player 0 wins a play according to this
condition if each visit to some vertex from Qc is answered by some later visit
to a vertex from Pc, i.e., we define
ReqRes((Qc, Pc)c∈[d]) =
{v0v1v2 · · · ∈ V ω | ∀c ∈ [d]∀j ∈ N. vj ∈ Qc implies ∃j′ ≥ j. vj′ ∈ Pc} .
We say that a visit to a vertex from Qc opens a request for condition c and
that the first visit to a vertex from Pc afterwards answers the request for that
condition.
Proposition 14 ([13]). Request-response games with n vertices and d request-
response pairs can be solved in time O(n2d22d).
Furthermore, let G be a request-response game with d request-response
pairs. If Player 0 has a winning strategy in G, then she has a finite-state
winning strategy of size at most d2d.
We extend this qualitative winning condition to a quantitative one us-
ing families of cost functions Cost = (Costc)c∈[d], where Costc : E → N for
each c ∈ [d] and lift the cost functions Costc to play infixes pi in A by adding
up the costs along pi. The cost-of-response for a request for condition c at
position j is then defined as
ReqResCorc(v0v1v2 · · · , j) ={
min{Costc(vj · · · vj′) | j′ ≥ j and vj′ ∈ Pc} if vj ∈ Qc ,
0 otherwise ,
with min ∅ =∞, which naturally extends to the (total) cost-of-response
ReqResCor(ρ, j) = maxc∈[d]ReqResCorc(ρ, j) .
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Finally, we define the request-response condition with costs as
CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) = supj→∞ReqResCor(ρ, j) ,
i.e., this condition measures the maximal cost incurred by any request in ρ.
We call a game G = (A,CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)) a request-response game
with costs. We denote the largest cost assigned to any edge by W . As we
assume the functions Costc to be given in binary encoding, the largest cost W
assigned to an edge may be exponential in the size of G.
If all Costc assign zero to every edge, then the request-response condition
with costs coincides with the qualitative request-response condition. In gen-
eral, however, the request-response condition with costs is a strengthening of
the classic request-response condition: If some play ρ has finite cost accord-
ing to the condition with costs, then it is winning for Player 0 according to
the qualitative condition, but not vice versa.
Remark 15. Let G = (A,CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)) be a request-response
game with costs. If a strategy σ for Player 0 in G has finite cost, then σ
is a winning strategy for Player 0 in the qualitative game (A,ReqRes(Γ)).
This remark together with a detour via qualitative request-response games
yield a cap for request-response games with costs.
Lemma 16. Let G be a request-response game with costs with n vertices, d
request-response pairs, and largest cost of an edge W . If Player 0 has a
strategy with finite cost in G, then she also has a strategy with cost at most
d2dnW .
Proof. Let G = (A,CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)) and let G ′ = (A,ReqRes(Γ))
be a qualitative request-response game obtained by disregarding the cost
functions of G. Moreover, let σ be a strategy with finite cost for G. Due
to Remark 15, the strategy σ is winning for Player 0 in G ′ as well, hence
Player 0 wins G ′. Thus, due to Proposition 14, she has a winning strategy σ′
of size at most d2d in G ′. Let σ′ be implemented by the memory structureM
and let b = d2dnW . We show CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(σ′) ≤ b.
Let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play consistent with σ′ and assume towards a con-
tradiction CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) > b. Then there exist c ∈ [d] and j ∈ N
such that ReqResCorc(ρ, j) > b. As each edge has cost at most W , the
request for condition c opened at position j is not answered for at least d2dn
steps, i.e., we obtain vj′ /∈ Pc for all j′ with j ≤ j′ ≤ j + d2dn. Let ext(ρ) =
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(v0,m0)(v1,m1)(v2,m2) · · · . Since |M| ≤ d2d, there exists a vertex repetition
on the play infix (vj,mj) · · · (vj+d2dn,mj+d2dn) of ext(ρ), say at positions k
and k′ with j ≤ k < k′ ≤ j+d2dn. Thus, the play ρ′ = v0 · · · vk(vk+1 · · · vk′)ω
is consistent with σ′.
In ρ′, however, a request for condition c is opened at position j ≤ k. Since
we have j ≤ k′ ≤ j + d2dn, this request is not answered in the play infix
vj · · · vk · · · vk′ , i.e., it is never answered. Hence, ρ′ /∈ ReqRes(Γ), which
contradicts σ′ being a winning strategy for Player 0 in G ′.
Having obtained a cap for request-response games with costs, we can now
turn to the main result of this section: Request-response games with costs
are reducible to vertex-ranked sup-request-response games. In order to show
this, we use a memory structure that keeps track of the costs incurred by the
requests open at each point in the play [7].
Lemma 17. Let G be a request-response game with costs with n vertices, d
request-response pairs, and highest cost of an edge W . Then G ≤b+1M G ′
for b = d2dnW , some memory structure M of size O(2nbd), and a vertex-
ranked sup-request-response game G ′ with d request-response pairs.
Proof. Let G = (A,CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)) with initial vertex vI . Recall
that b is a cap of G due to Lemma 16. We first define the memory struc-
ture M. Intuitively, we use it to keep track of the currently open requests
and the costs they have incurred up to the cap b. Once the cost of a single
request incurs a cost greater than b, the memory structure raises a Boolean
flag, which indicates that Player 1 can unbound the cost of that request.
Let r : [d] → {⊥} ∪ [b + 1] = {⊥, 0, . . . , b} be a function mapping condi-
tions c to the cost r(c) ∈ [b + 1] they have incurred so far, or to r(c) = ⊥ if
no request for that condition is pending. We call such a function a request-
function and denote the set of all request functions by R. We define the
initial request function rI such that rI(c) = 0 if vI ∈ Qc and rI(c) = ⊥
otherwise. In order to be able to access the current vertex during the update
of the memory structure, we store it in the memory structure as well. By
accessing the current vertex together with the vertex that we move to, we
are thus able to obtain the cost of the traversed edge. Finally, we store a
flag that indicates whether or not the bound b has been exceeded. Hence, we
define the set of memory states M = V ×R×{0, 1} with the initial memory
state mI = (vI , rI , 0).
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We define the update function Upd((v, r, f), v′) = (v′, r′, f ′) by perform-
ing the following steps in order:
• For each c ∈ [d], if v ∈ Pc, set r′(c) = ⊥. Otherwise, set r′(c) = r(c).
• For each c ∈ [d], if r′(c) 6= ⊥, set r′(c) = r′(c) + Costc((v, v′)).
• Now, if there exists a condition c such that r′(c) > b, then set r′(c) = ⊥
for all c and set f ′ = 1. Otherwise, set f ′ = f .
• For each c ∈ [d], if v′ ∈ Qc, set r′(c) to max{r′(c), 0} where max{⊥, 0} =
0.
Note that we replicate the current vertex v in the memory state in order to
be able to access it in the update of the memory state during the move to v′,
thereby attaining access to the traversed edge (v, v′).
We obtainM = (M,mI ,Upd). Clearly, we have |M| ∈ O(2nbd), i.e.,M
is of exponential size in d, but only of polynomial size in n and W .
Using this definition, we obtain that if CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) ≤ b,
then the extended play ext(ρ) remains in vertices of the form (v, v, r, 0).
Dually, if CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) > b, then ext(ρ) eventually moves to
vertices of the form (v, v, r, 1) and remains there ad infinitum.
Let Γ = (Qc, Pc)c∈[d]. It remains to define the vertex-ranking func-
tion rk: V × M → N, as well as the family of request-response pairs Γ′
for G ′. We define the former as
rk(v, v, r, f) =
{
max{0,maxc∈[d] r(c)} if f = 0 and
b+ 1 otherwise
and the latter as
Γ′ = (Q′c, P
′
c)c∈[d], where Q
′
c = Qc ×Qc ×R× {0, 1} and
P ′c = Pc × Pc ×R× {0, 1} for all c ∈ [d] .
Note that ρ ∈ ReqRes(Γ) if and only if ext(ρ) ∈ ReqRes(Γ′).
We first argue that the ranking functions included in the memory state
indeed contain information about the cost incurred so far by open requests
as long as the cost of the play does not exceed b. In order to do so,
let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be some play in G with CostReqRes(Γ,Cost)(ρ) ≤ b
and let ext(ρ) = (v0, v0, r0, f0)(v1, v1, r1, f1)(v2, v2, r2, f2) · · · be its extension.
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Intuitively, since the cost of ρ does not exceed the bound b, the flags fj are
not raised and the request functions track the cost of all requests precisely.
More formally if, for some c ∈ [d] and some j ∈ N with vj ∈ Qc, we
have ReqResCorc(ρ, j) = b
′, then rj′(c) = b′, where j′ ≥ j is the earliest
position at which the request for c opened at position j is answered. Du-
ally, if rj′(c) = b
′ for some j′ ∈ N, some b′ ∈ N, and some c ∈ [d], then
ReqResCorc(ρ, j) ≥ b′, where j ≤ j′ is the earliest position at which the
request for condition c is opened without being answered prior to position j′.
In particular, if rj′(c) = b
′ with j′, b′, and c as above and we additionally
have vj′ ∈ Pc, then ReqResCorc(ρ, j) = b′.
We define G ′ = (A×M,Ranksup(ReqRes(Γ′), rk)). Moreover, since Γ′
is the extension of Γ to the vertices of A×M, the game G ′ contains d many
request-response pairs.
It remains to show G ≤b+1M G ′. Recall that, since we do not name a
(b+ 1)-correction function explicitly, we implicitly use the (b+ 1)-correction-
function capb+1. Clearly, the first and second condition of the definition of a
quantitative reduction hold true, i.e., the arena of G ′ is A ×M and capb+1
is a (b + 1)-correction function. It remains to show the two latter con-
ditions. To this end, let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · ∈ V ω be a play in G and let
ext(ρ) = (v0, v0, r0, f0)(v1, v1, r1, f1)(v2, v2, r2, f2) · · · be its unique extended
play in G ′. We use the shorthands CostG = CostReqRes(Γ,Cost) as well
as CostG′ = Ranksup(ReqRes(Γ′), rk).
We first show CostG(ρ) = CostG′(ext(ρ)) for all ρ with CostG(ρ) < b + 1.
Let CostG(ρ) = b′ < b + 1 and note that this implies ρ ∈ ReqRes(Γ) and
ext(ρ) ∈ ReqRes(Γ′) as well as fj = 0 for all j ∈ N. As argued above,
we obtain rk(vj, vj, rj, fj) ≤ b′ for all j, which implies CostG′(ext(ρ)) ≤ b′.
Moreover, let c ∈ [d] and j ∈ N with vj ∈ Qc such that ReqResCorc(ρ, j) =
b′. Since b′ <∞, such c and j exist. The play ext(ρ) visits a vertex of rank b′
at the position at which the request for condition c opened at position j is
answered for the first time. Thus, CostG′(ext(ρ)) ≥ b′, which concludes this
part of the proof.
It remains to show that CostG′(ext(ρ)) ≥ capb+1(b+ 1) = b+ 1 holds true
for all ρ with CostG(ρ) ≥ b + 1. To this end, let CostG(ρ) = b′ ≥ b + 1.
As argued above, the extended play ext(ρ) eventually moves to vertices of
the form (v, v, r, 1) and remains there. Hence, CostG′(ext(ρ)) = b + 1 if ρ ∈
ReqRes(Γ), i.e., if ext(ρ) ∈ ReqRes(Γ′). If, however, ρ /∈ ReqRes(Γ),
then ext(ρ) /∈ ReqRes(Γ′) and hence, CostG′(ρ) =∞ > b+ 1.
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Thus, in order to solve a request-response game with costs with respect
to some b, it suffices to solve a vertex-ranked sup-request-response game with
respect to b. This, in turn, can be done by reducing the problem to that of
solving a request-response game as shown in Theorem 7. Using this reduction
together with the framework of quality-preserving reductions, we are able to
provide an upper bound on the complexity of solving request-response games
with costs with respect to some bound b.
Theorem 18. The following decision problem is in ExpTime: “Given some
request-response game with costs G and some bound b ∈ N, does Player 0 have
a strategy σ with Cost(σ) ≤ b in G?”
Proof. Let G contain n vertices, d request-response pairs, and let W be the
largest cost assigned to any edge. We first construct the vertex-ranked sup-
request-response game G ′ from G as shown in Lemma 17. Recall that G ′
contains O(n(d2dnW )d) vertices and d request-response pairs. Due to the in-
stantiation of Theorem 7 with the decision procedure for qualitative request-
response games from Proposition 14, the game G ′ can be solved with respect
to b in time
O(n(d2dnW )d + (n(d2dnW )d))2d22d) =
O(n(d2dnW )d + n2(d2dnW )2dd22d) = O(n2(d2dnW )2dd22d) .
Due to W 2d ∈ O((2|G|)|G|) = O(2|G|2), this is exponential in the description
length of G.
Moreover, solving request-response games is known to be ExpTime-
hard [27]. Thus, solving quantitative request-response games with costs via
quantitative reductions is asymptotically optimal.
Furthermore, by leveraging our results on the sizes of memory structures
in vertex-ranked sup-games we obtain an upper bound on the size of strategies
with a given cost in request-response games with costs.
Lemma 19. Let G be a request-response game with costs with n vertices, d
request-response pairs, and largest cost of an edge W . If Player 0 has a
strategy in G with finite cost, then she also has a strategy in G with finite cost
of size at most O(nbdd2d), where b = d2dnW .
Proof. Let σ be a strategy for Player 0 in G with finite cost. Due to Lemma 16,
Player 0 has a strategy σ′ in G with cost at most d2dnW . Let G ′sup be
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the vertex-ranked sup-request-response game constructed in the proof of
Lemma 17 and recall that G ′sup has d request-response pairs as well.
Due to Theorem 2, and since b is a cap of G due to Lemma 16, Player 0 has
a strategy σ′sup with cost at most d2
dnW in G ′sup. Let G ′ be the qualitative
request-response game corresponding to G ′sup, i.e., the game played in the
same arena as G ′sup in which a play is winning for Player 0 if and only if it
has finite cost in G ′sup.
Clearly, the strategy σ′sup is winning for Player 0 in G ′ as well. By ap-
plying Proposition 14 we obtain that Player 0 has a winning strategy of size
at most d2d in G ′. By furthermore applying Corollary 9 and Theorem 3,
we obtain that Player 0 has a strategy of finite cost of size O(2nbdd2d) =
O(nbdd2d).
Finally, the optimization problem of finding the minimal b′ such that
Player 0 wins a request-response game with costs G with respect to b′ can be
solved in exponential time as well. Recall that if Player 0 wins G with respect
to some b′, then she also wins it with respect to all b′′ ≥ b′. Since we can
assume b′ ≤ b = d2dnW , we can perform a binary search for b′ on the interval
{0, . . . , b}. Hence, the optimal b′ can be found in time O(log(b)(n2b2dd22d)).
5.2. Reducing Quantitative Muller Games to Vertex-Ranked Safety Games
Having shown how our framework can be used to find optimal strategies
in request-response games with costs in a structured and modular way, we
now show how it can be used to greatly simplify existing methods for finding
such strategies. To this end, we show how to reduce quantitative Muller
games to vertex-ranked safety games, i.e., vertex-ranked games in which it
is the aim of Player 0 to avoid a certain set of undesirable vertices. In
order to do so, we leverage techniques introduced by Neider, Rabinovich,
and Zimmermann [28].
Let A be some arena with vertex set V and recall that the qualitative
Muller condition is defined via a partition of 2V into (F0,F1) as
Muller(F0,F1) = {ρ ∈ V ω | inf(ρ) ∈ F0} ,
where inf(ρ) denotes the set of vertices that are visited infinitely often by ρ.
Thus, Player i wins ρ if and only if inf(ρ) ∈ Fi.
McNaughton introduced a quantitative characterization of the Muller
condition by assigning a score to each prefix of a play and each subset of
the set of vertices [22]. In order to characterize the set of vertices visited
38
infinitely often during a play, the score of a subset F measures how often F
has been visited completely without leaving it. For a play ρ, the limit inferior
of the score of inf(ρ) tends towards infinity, while the limit inferior of the
score for all other sets is zero [22].
Formally, for any set F ⊆ V with F 6= ∅, the score ScoreF (pi) is defined
inductively using an accumulator that stores the vertices of F that have
already been visited, as follows:
(AccF (ε), ScoreF (ε)) = (∅, 0)
(AccF (piv), ScoreF (piv)) =
(∅, 0) if v /∈ F
(∅, ScoreF (pi) + 1) if v ∈ F and AccF (pi) = F \ {v}
(AccF (pi) ∪ {v}, ScoreF (pi)) otherwise
We generalize the score-function to families F of subsets of vertices,
i.e., F ⊆ 2V , by defining ScoreF(pi) = maxF∈F(ScoreF (pi)) and to infinite
plays by defining ScoreF(v0v1v2 · · · ) = supj→∞ ScoreF(v0 · · · vj). This defini-
tion inspires the quantitative Muller condition, which is defined as
QuantMuller(F0,F1)(ρ) = ScoreF1(ρ) .
We obtain a cap for such games via leveraging a result by Fearnley and
Zimmermann [29].
Lemma 20. Let G = (A,Cost) be a quantitative Muller game. If Player 0
has a strategy σ with finite cost in G, then she has a strategy σ′ with Cost(σ′) ≤
2.
Proof. Let G = (A,QuantMuller(F0,F1)). Since Cost(σ) <∞, for every
play ρ consistent with σ and every prefix pi of ρ, we have that there exists an
upper bound on ScoreF (pi) for all F ∈ F1. Moreover, as the score of inf(ρ)
tends towards ∞, this implies inf(ρ) ∈ F0, i.e., σ is a winning strategy for
the qualitative Muller game G ′ = (A,Muller(F0,F1)).
It is known that, since Player 0 wins G ′, she has a strategy σ′ with
ScoreF1(pi) ≤ 2 for all prefixes pi of all plays consistent with σ′ [29]. Thus,
we directly obtain QuantMuller(F0,F1)(σ′) ≤ 2.
We now show how to reduce quantitative Muller games to vertex-ranked
sup-safety games based on previous work by Neider, Rabinovich, and Zim-
mermann [28]. Recall that a safety game is a very simple qualitative game,
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in which it is Player 0’s goal to avoid a certain set of undesirable vertices.
Formally, the safety condition is defined via a set U ⊆ V as
Safety(U) = {v0v1v2 · · · ∈ V ω | ∀j ∈ Nvj /∈ U} .
In order to construct the safety game, we define an equivalence relation
over play prefixes, such that two play prefixes are equivalent if they have
the same accumulator and the same score with respect to all F ∈ F1. The
constructed safety game uses as vertices representatives of the equivalence
classes of all play prefixes that have a cost of at most 2 for all F ∈ F1.
Moreover, it mimics play prefixes pi of cost at most 2 in the Muller game by
moving to some vertex pi′ such that the score and the accumulator are equal
in pi and pi′ for all F ∈ F1. We show how to lift this qualitative construction
to the setting of quantitative games by providing a quantitative reduction
from quantitative Muller games to vertex-ranked sup-safety games.
Lemma 21. Let G be a quantitative Muller game with n vertices. There
exists a memory structure M of size at most (n!)3 and a vertex-ranked sup-
safety game G ′ such that G ≤3M G ′.
Proof. Let G = (A,Cost) with Cost = QuantMuller(F0,F1). We say that
two play prefixes pi and pi′ are F1-equivalent if they end in the same vertex
and if, for each F ∈ F1, we have AccF (pi) = AccF (pi′) and ScoreF (pi) =
ScoreF (pi
′). In this case, we write pi ≈F1 pi′. For each play prefix pi, we
denote the F1-equivalence-class of pi by [pi]≈F1 = {pi′ ∈ V ∗ | pi ≈F1 pi′}.
Furthermore, for each set Π ⊆ V ∗ of play prefixes we define the ≈F1-quotient
of Π as (Π
/ ≈F1) = {[pi]≈F1 | pi ∈ Π}. For the sake of readability, we omit the
index F1 of the score-function and the index ≈F1 of the equivalence class for
the remainder of this proof wherever possible without introducing ambiguity.
Let Plays≤2 = {pi ∈ V ∗ | ScoreF1(pi) ≤ 2} be the set of play prefixes whose
score is at most two. We define the set of memory states M =
(
Plays≤2
/ ≈)∪
{⊥}, the initial memory state mI = [vI ], and the update function Upd
as Upd(⊥, v) = ⊥, Upd(pi, v) = [piv] if Score(piv) ≤ 2 and Upd(pi, v) = ⊥
otherwise. We obtain |M | ∈ O(|Plays≤2
/ ≈|). Since |Plays≤2/ ≈ | ≤ (n!)3
due to Neider, Rabinovich, and Zimmermann [28], the memory structureM
is of size at most (n!)3 as well.
A straightforward induction shows that this memory structure tracks the
score of a play precisely as long as it does not exceed the value two on any
prefix. More formally, it satisfies the following invariant:
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Let pi = v0 · · · vj be a play prefix in G such that Score(v0 · · · vk) ≤
2 for all k with 0 ≤ k ≤ j. Moreover, let Upd+(pi) = pi′. Then pi ≈
pi′.
Recall Safety(U) = {v0v1v2 · · · ∈ V ω | ∀j ∈ N. vj /∈ U}. We define the
vertex-ranked sup-safety game G ′ = (A×M,Ranksup(Safety(V ×{⊥}), rk)),
with rk(v, pi) = Score(pi) for all pi ∈ Plays≤2, and rk(v,⊥) = 3.
Let Cost′ = Ranksup(Safety(V × {⊥}), rk). Clearly, the first two items
of the definition of G ≤3M G ′ hold true. It remains to show Cost(ρ) =
Cost′(ext(ρ)) for all ρ with Cost(ρ) < 3 and Cost′(ext(ρ)) ≥ 3 for all other ρ.
First, let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be some play with Cost(ρ) ≤ 2 and let ext(ρ) =
(v0,m0)(v1,m1)(v2,m2) · · · . Then Score(v0 · · · vj) ≤ 2 for all j ∈ N. Thus,
due to the invariant above and the definition of rk, we obtain rk(vj,mj) =
Score(v0 · · · vj) for all j ∈ N, which implies Cost′(ext(ρ)) = Cost(ρ).
Towards a proof of the latter statement, let ρ = v0v1v2 · · · be a play with
Cost(ρ) ≥ 3 and let j be the minimal position such that Cost(v0 · · · vj) = 3.
Since Cost(v0 · · · vj) = ScoreF (v0 · · · vj) for some F ∈ F1 and since the score is
at most incremented by one during each step, we obtain ScoreF (v0 · · · vj−1) =
2, AccF (v0 · · · vj−1) = F \ {vj}, and vj ∈ F . Let Upd+(v0 · · · vj−1) = pi′.
Due to the invariant we obtain ScoreF (pi
′) = 2 and AccF (pi′) = F \ {vj}.
Thus, ScoreF (pi
′vj) = 3, hence ext(v0 · · · vj) = (v0,mI) · · · (vj,⊥), which im-
plies ext(ρ) /∈ Safety(V × {⊥}), which in turn yields Cost′(ext(ρ)) = ∞ >
3.
Thus, in order to solve a quantitative Muller game with respect to some b,
it suffices to solve a vertex-ranked sup-safety game G ′ with respect to b. Recall
that this is only constructive if Player 0 wins G ′ with respect to b < 3, i.e.,
only in this case are we able to construct a strategy with cost at most b
for her in G. Otherwise, Theorem 2 yields that there exists a strategy of
cost ∞ for Player 1 in G, but we cannot construct such a strategy from his
strategy of cost greater than two in G ′. This is consistent with results of
Neider et al. [28] and with the fact that Muller conditions are in a higher
level of the Borel hierarchy than safety conditions. Hence, qualitative Muller
games cannot be reduced to safety games.
We can, however, solve the resulting vertex-ranked sup-safety game with
respect to a given bound by solving a qualitative safety game as shown in
Theorem 7. Using this reduction together with the framework of quality-
preserving reductions, we obtain an upper bound on the complexity of solving
quantitative Muller games with respect to some bound b.
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Theorem 22. The following problem can be solved in time O((n!)3): “Given
some quantitative Muller game G with n vertices and some bound b ∈ N, does
Player 0 win G with respect to b?”
Proof. Given G, we first construct the vertex-ranked sup-safety game G ′ as
shown in Lemma 21. Recall that G ′ contains at most (n!)3 vertices. Due to
Theorem 7 and the fact that safety games can be solved in linear time in the
number of vertices, G ′ can indeed be solved in time at most O((n!)3) with
respect to a given bound b.
Analogously to the reasoning leading to Corollary 9 on Page 25 and to
Corollary 13 on Page 31, we are now also able to provide an upper bound on
the size of strategies for Player 0 in quantitative Muller games. Since both
players have positional winning strategies in safety games, an application of
Theorem 3 to Lemma 21 yields that if Player 0 has a strategy with cost at
most three in a quantitative Muller game G with n vertices, then she also
has a strategy in G with the same cost and of size at most exponential in n.
Moreover, we can bound the complexity of the optimization problem
for quantitative Muller games as follows: Finding the minimal b such that
Player 0 has a strategy of cost at most b in G requires solving at most three
safety games of size in O((n!)3). Thus, the optimization problem for quanti-
tative Muller games can be solved in factorial time.
5.3. Fault Resilient Strategies for Safety Games
We now demonstrate the flexibility and versatility of vertex-ranked games
in their own right. To this end, we consider the problem of synthesizing a
controller for a reactive system that is embedded into some environment.
This setting is typically modeled as an infinite game in which Player 0 and
Player 1 take the roles of the controller and of the environment, respectively.
Here, we consider safety games, i.e., we assume that the specification for the
controller is given as a game in which it is the aim of Player 0 to keep the
play inside a safe subset of the vertices.
Dallal, Neider, and Tabuada [23] argue that this setting is not sufficiently
expressive to correctly model a real-world scenario, since it assumes that
Player 0 can accurately predict the effect of her actions on the state of the
system. In a realistic setting, in contrast, faults may occur, i.e., an action
chosen by a controller may be executed incorrectly, or it may not be executed
at all.
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In order to model such faults, Dallal, Neider, and Tabuada introduce are-
nas with faults AF = (V, V0, V1, E, F, vI), which consist of an arena without
faults (V, V0, V1, E, vI) and a set of faults F ⊆ V0 × V . In such an arena,
whenever it is the turn of Player 0, say at vertex v, a fault (v, v′) ∈ F may
occur, resulting in the play continuing in vertex v′ instead of that chosen by
Player 0. Moreover, Dallal et al. consider safety conditions, i.e., qualitative
winning conditions of the form Safety(U) = {v0v1v2 · · · | ∀j ∈ N. vj /∈ U} for
some U ⊆ V . Hence, it is the aim of Player 0 to keep the play outside the
“unsafe” set of vertices U . If the play enters the set U , it is declared winning
for Player 1. The task at hand is to compute a fault-resilient strategy for
Player 0 that forces the play to remain inside V \ U and that can “tolerate”
as many faults as possible.
Safety games without faults are solved by a simple attractor construction:
As soon as the play enters W1 = Attr1(U), Player 1 can play consistently
with his attractor strategy towards U in order to win the play. Thus, it is
the aim of Player 0 to keep the play inside W0 = V \W1.
Dallal, Neider, and Tabuada solve the problem of computing fault-resilient
strategies for safety games by adapting the classic algorithm for solving safety
games to this setting. In doing so, they obtain a value val(v) for each ver-
tex v that denotes the minimal number of faults that need to occur in order
for the play to reach W1, if Player 0 plays well. Furthermore, they show
that val can be computed in polynomial time in |V |. Finally, due to the
existence of positional winning strategies for both players in safety games,
they obtain val(v) ∈ [n]∪ {∞} for all v ∈ V . Then, a fault-resilient strategy
for Player 0 is one that maximizes the minimal value val(v) witnessed during
any play. Dallal, Neider, and Tabuada construct such a strategy on the fly
during the computation of val(v) [23].
This task can, however, easily be reframed as a vertex-ranked game in
the arena A = (V, V0, V1, E, vI), which we obtain from AF by omitting the
faults. In that game, we assign to each vertex the rank rk(v) = |V | − val(v)
if val(v) ∈ [n] and rk(v) = 0 otherwise, i.e., if val(v) = ∞. Then, Player 0
has a strategy with cost at most b in G ′ = (A,Ranksup(Safety(U), rk)) if
and only if she has a winning strategy in the original safety game with faults
that tolerates at least |V | − b faults.
This formulation as a vertex-ranked game enables further study of games
in arenas with faults. Here, we require the winning condition to be a safety
condition in order to compute val(v). In recent work, we have shown how
to compute this value for more complex qualitative winning conditions [30].
43
If val(v) is effectively computable for a given qualitative winning condition,
one can easily obtain fault-resilient strategies by formulating the task as a
vertex-ranked game as demonstrated.
Finally, the formulation as a vertex-ranked game yields a method to com-
pute eventually-fault-resilient strategies, i.e., strategies that are resilient to
a large number of faults after a finite “start-up” phase. In order to obtain
such strategies, it suffices to view the resulting vertex-ranked games as a
lim sup-game instead of a sup-game and to solve it optimally as described in
Section 4.2.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we have lifted the concept of reductions, which has yielded a
multitude of results in the area of qualitative games, to quantitative games.
We have shown that this novel concept exhibits the same useful properties
for quantitative games as it does for qualitative ones and that it furthermore
retains the quality of strategies.
Additionally, we have provided two very general types of quantitative
games that serve as targets for quantitative reductions, namely vertex-ranked
sup games and vertex-ranked lim sup-games. For both kinds of games we have
shown a polynomial overhead on the complexity of solving them with respect
to some bound, on the memory necessary to achieve a given cost, and on the
complexity of determining the optimal cost that either player can ensure.
Finally, we have demonstrated the versatility of these tools by using them
to solve quantitative request-response games and quantitative Muller games
and by showing how to solve the problem of computing fault-resilient strate-
gies in safety games via vertex-ranked games. This last formulation enables a
general study of games with faults, even in the presence of more complex win-
ning conditions than the safety condition considered by Dallal et al. [23] and
in this work. We are currently investigating how to leverage vertex-ranked
games for the synthesis of fault-resistant strategies in parity games.
Further research continues in two additional directions: Firstly, while
the framework of quantitative reductions and vertex-ranked games yields
upper bounds on the complexity of solving quantitative games, it does not
directly yield lower bounds on the complexity of the problems under investi-
gation. Consider, for example, the threshold problem for parity games with
costs, which is PSpace-complete [7]. It is possible to reduce this problem to
that of solving a vertex-ranked parity game of exponential size and linearly
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many colors similarly to the reduction presented in this work, which yields
an ExpTime-algorithm. It remains open how to use quantitative reductions
to obtain an algorithm for this problem that only requires polynomial space.
Secondly, another goal for future work is the establishment of an analogue
to the Borel hierarchy for quantitative winning conditions. In the qualitative
case, this hierarchy establishes clear boundaries for reductions between infi-
nite games, i.e., a game whose winning condition is in one level of the Borel
hierarchy cannot be reduced to one with a winning condition in a lower level.
Also, each game with a winning condition in the hierarchy is known to be
determined [31]. To the best of our knowledge, it is open how to define
such a hierarchy for quantitative winning conditions which exhibit similar
properties.
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